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INTRODUCTION 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have threatened the vitality of 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, collectively known as supplemental 
jurisdiction. Under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine, federal 
courts had for many years entertained supplemental claims over which 
they would not otherwise have had jurisdiction. Through judicial law-
making, they had fashioned the doctrine by expansively interpreting 
the word "case" in Article III of the United States Constitution. In 
1990, to prevent further erosion of supplemental jurisdiction, Congress 
enacted legislation that placed the doctrine on a statutory footing. 
On December 1, 1990, President Bush approved the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990. 1 Title III of that Act, the "Federal Courts 
Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990" (hereinafter Imple-
mentation Act),2 enacted a number of recommendations contained in 
the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee,3 released on April 
2, 1990. Section 310 of the Implementation Act codified supplemental 
jurisdiction by creating a new section, section 1367 of title 28.4 This 
codification was the first congressional effort to address this subject 
comprehensively. On prior occasions, Congress has expressly legis-
lated supplemental jurisdiction in limited areas, the most prominent of 
which are: (1) actions involving copyright, plant variety, trademark, 
and patent claims;s (2) actions removed from state to federal court;6 
1. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (to be codified as amended in scattered 
titles of U.S.C.). 
2. Id. at 5104. 
3. FEDERAL STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
MITTEE (April & July 1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
4. See Appendix A for statutory text. 
5. 28 U.S.c. § 1338(b) (1988) provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
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and (3) bankruptcy cases.7 In three other areas, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the relevant jurisdictional statutes to prohibit the as-
sertion of some supplemental claims. 8 
The historic nature of congressional action in codifying supple-
mental jurisdiction in section 1367 calls for a close examination of the 
legislative process and product. Section I of this Article presents a 
brief survey of the development of supplemental jurisdiction. Section 
II examines the history of the legislative process that produced section 
1367. Section III contains a preliminary review of judicial decisions 
under the new supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Article con-
cludes with some editorial remarks regarding the statute and the pro-
cess by which it became public law. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
Current terminology refers to the doctrines of pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction collectively as "incidental" or "supplemental" juris-
diction. The new provision, section 1367, employs the latter phrase, 
which courts and commentators appeared to favor prior to the enact-
diction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a sub-
stantial and related claim under the copyright, patent,_ plant variety protection or trade-
mark laws." Id. 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 144I(c) as amended by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 
provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, within the juris-
diction conferred by section 1331 of this title, is joined with one or more other-
wise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed 
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may 
remand all matters in which State law predominates. 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 
5089, 5114. 
Section 312 of Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act, the Federal Courts Study 
Committee Implementation Act of 1990, amended this section to limit its reach to actions 
based on the general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See 
discussion infra at Section II.C.4. 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) provides in relevant part: "[T]he district courts shall 
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceectings arising under title II [the 
Bankruptcy Code], or arising in or related to cases under title II." Id. See also 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
8. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) forbids a plain-
tiff who asserts a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act from asserting a supplemental 
claim against a person who is not already a party to the action); Owen Equip. & Erection 
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (28 U.S.C. § 1332 forbids a plaintiff from asserting a 
supplemental claim against an impleaded defendant who is not diverse from the plaintift); 
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1(1976) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) forbids a plaintiff who asserts 
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from asserting a supplemental claim against a municipality 
that is not already a party to the action). 
4 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
ment of the new statute.9 The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction 
permits the federal courts to entertain claims over which they would 
not otherwise have jurisdiction. In other words, the supplemental or 
non-federal claim does not have an independent basis of jurisdiction. 
The federal or jurisdiction-conferring claim could be rooted in anyone 
of many federal statutes that give the district courts jurisdiction based 
on the nature of the claim (for example, federal question cases) or the 
nature of the party (for example, diversity cases). The non-federal 
claim that does not have an independent basis of jurisdiction is usually 
rooted in state law, although many such claims are based on other 
sources, such as foreign law. 
The development of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction 
moved through four stages. The first stage encompassed the period 
between the decisions of the Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States 10 in 1824 and United Mine. Workers v. Gibbs 11 in 1966. 
The second stage began with Gibbs, the landmark case that expanded 
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction, and continued until Aldinger v. 
Howard l2 in 1976. The third stage commenced with Aldinger, when 
the Court started restricting supplemental jurisdiction, and continued 
through Finley v. United States 13 in 1989 up to the enactment of sec-
tion 1367 on December 1, 1990. The fourth stage began with the en-
actment of section 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute. 14 
A. Early Development 
Some commentators IS trace the roots of supplemental jurisdiction 
to the 1824 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Osborn v. 
Bank of the United States .16 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Mar-
9. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After 
Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) [hereinafter 
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity]; Richard D. Freer, A Principled 
Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34 [hereinafter Freer, A 
Principled Statutory Approach]; Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction 
Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. to3 
(1983); Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 247. One commentator traces the use of the word "supplemental" as a 
jurisdictional concept to equity practice of antiquity. Susan M. Glenn, Note, Federal Sup-
plemental Enforcement Jurisdiction, 42 S.C. L. REV. 469 (1991). 
to. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
11. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
12. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
13. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
14. This fourth stage will be discussed in Section III. 
15. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.4.1 (1989); CHARLES 
A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (4th ed. 1983). 
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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shall observed: 
There is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the con-
stitution, laws or treaties of the United States. . . . If it be a suffi-
cient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the 
party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or 
law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construc-
tion, ... then all the other questions must be decided as incidental 
to this, which gives that jurisdiction. 17 
5 
The "other questions" to which he referred were matters arising under 
state law, the decision of which was both necessary and "incidental"18 
to the federal questions. Since nearly every case arising under federal 
law would raise non-federal questions, as Marshall noted, the federal 
court must have the authority to resolve all of the issues in the case. 19 
While the federal courts could have limited the Osborn language 
to resolving only state law questions, but not separate, state-based 
claims, they did not interpret the words so restrictively. In succeeding 
years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts employed the doc-
trine of supplemental jurisdiction in a wide variety of contexts, permit-
ting the joinder of additional claims and parties even without an 
independent basis of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the requirement of 
complete diversity, 20 for example, the Supreme Court permitted per-
sons to intervene as defendants to protect their property interests even 
though they were citizens of the same state as the plaintiff.21 In later 
years the Court also permitted defendants to assert, against non-di-
verse plaintiffs, state-based counterclaims arising out of the same 
17. Id. at 820, 822. Even Justice Johnson in dissent agreed. "No one can question, 
that the Court which has jurisdiction of the principal question, must exercise jurisdiction 
over every question." Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
18. Id. at 822. Some authors have used the word "incidental" to describe a unified 
doctrine of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Eg., Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and 
Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1935 
(1982). The more common phrase is "supplemental jurisdiction," which § 1367 employs. 
See supra text accompanying note 9. 
19. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822. Of course, the presence of those "other ques-
tions" in the case does not deprive Congress of the power to confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts over the federal issues. 
[W)hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the 
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Con-
gress to give the [federal] [c]ourts jurisdiction of that cause, although other ques-
tions of fact or of law may be involved in it. 
Id. at 823. 
20. The requirement of complete diversity, in which each plaintiff must be a citizen 
of a different state from each defendant, traces its lineage to Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3.3. 
21. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861). 
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transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintifrs federal 
claim.22 Indeed the Court, relying on supplemental jurisdiction, even 
permitted a plaintiff to assert a state law claim against an entity of 
state government,23 notwithstanding state sovereign immunity embed-
ded in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.24 
In 1933, the Supreme Court sought to restate the doctrine of sup-
plemental jurisdiction in Hum v. Oursler. 25 For federal court jurisdic-
tional purposes, the Court distinguished cases in which state and 
federal grounds are asserted in . support of a "single cause of action" 
from suits where the state and federal bases comprise "two separate 
and distinct causes of action. "26 In tying federal jurisdiction over non-
federal claims to the concept of a "single cause of action," the Court 
created a rule that was the "source of considerable confusion" in the 
lower federal courtS.27 Many years later the Court recognized that by 
the "first third of the 20th century, 'however, the phrase [cause of ac-
tion] had become so encrusted with doctrinal complexity that the au-
thors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eschewed it 
altogether."28 
B. The Gibbs Era 
In 1938, five years after Hum, the Supreme Court adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which laid the groundwork for a 
22. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926). 
23. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). However, the 
Supreme Court disapproved this use of supplemental jurisdiction in Pennhurst State School 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), which extended the reach of the Eleventh 
Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims against a state 
or its entities and officials. 
24. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
25. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). 
26. Id. at 246. The Court rejected the notion of defining "cause of action" by its 
factual underpinnings for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. Id. See generally Note, 
The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 
YALE L.J. 627 (1978). At other points in the Hum opinion, however, the Court did make 
reference to the claims as "dependent on the same facts," and as resting "upon identical 
facts." Hum, 289 U.S. at 244, 246. The attention in Hurn to the facts underlying claims 
might have inspired the Court in Gibbs to reformulate supplemental jurisdiction in terms of 
a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966). 
27. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. 
28. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979). Nonetheless, the Court in Davis 
continued the use of the phrase "cause of action," which created additional confusion 
among civil procedure mavens. Id. at 237, 239 nn.15, 18. 
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reformulation of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.29 Among 
other things, the rules merged law and equity into one civil actioll,3o 
provided for liberal joinder of claims and parties,31 and effected other 
reforms aimed at litigating all claims aQlorig the disputants in one law-
suit.32 In 1966, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the moderniza-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure· when it reformulated the 
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 
In the leading case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 33 the Court 
noted the difficulties experienced by the lower federal courts in apply-
ing the Hum "cause of action" doctrine.34 Referring to the rules and 
the tendency of its earlier cases to require a plaintiff to join all related 
claims in one action, the Court held that jurisdiction, in an Article III 
sense, exists if the relationship between the federal and state claims 
"permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional 'case.' "35 In short, the Court permitted 
29. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
30. FED R. eIV. P. 2. Rule 2 provides: "There shall be one form of action to be 
known as 'civil action.''' Id. 
31. See id. Rule 18 (joinder of claims and remedies); id. Rule 19 (joinder of persons 
needed for just adjudication); id. Rule 20 (permissive joinder of parties); id. Rule 21 (mis-
joinder and nonjoinder of parties). 
32. See id Rule 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim); id. Rule 14 (third-party prac-
tice); id. Rule 15 (amended and supplemental pleadings); id. Rule 22 (interpleader); id. 
Rule 24 (intervention); id. Rule 42 (consolidation). 
33. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
34. Id. at 724. 
35. Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). Although the Gibbs opinion is vulnerable on sev-
eral grounds, perhaps its most obvious tlaw is the Court's reversal of the usual analysis that 
addresses statutory issues before examining constitutional ·questions. See generally Michael 
Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 
(1968). Prior to determining the scope of the word "case" in Article III, the Gibbs Court 
should have studied the jurisdictional statute to determine whether Congress intended to 
confer pendent jurisdiction, and in what measure. If the statutory grant reached the state 
claim, only then would it have been necessary to decide whether that grant was within the 
confines of Article III. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. 
One commentator suggested that Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), may have 
undermined Gibbs by requiring that the plaintiff affirmatively show that Congress intended 
in the jurisdictional statute to permit the assertion of the particular pendent claim in ques-
tion. Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 
CoLUM. L. REV. 127 (1977). The thrust of Aldinger, as later amplified by the Court in 
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), did not go quite that far. 
Rather Aldinger and Kroger appeared to create a presumption in favor of pendent jurisdic-
tion that could be rebutted by a showing that Congress intended to exclude a particular 
pendent claim or party from the scope of federal jurisdiction. See generally Ellen S. 
Mouchawar, Note, The CongreSSional Resu"ection of Supplemental Jurisdiction in the 
Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611, 1624-25 (1991). The Court's subsequent decision 
in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), may indeed have gone that far. See infra 
notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Finley case. 
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the plaintiff to assert both federal and state law claims in one civil 
action even though the state claim did not have an independent basis 
of jurisdiction. 
After surmounting the constitutional objection to a more expan-
sive view of supplemental jurisdiction, the Court in Gibbs articulated 
the criteria by which to determine, in any given action, whether the 
federal and state claims do indeed constitute "one constitutional 
'case.''' With the vagaries of "cause of action" undoubtedly in mind, 
the Court adopted a two-pronged test to determine when non-federal 
claims (those which do not have an independent basis for federal juris-
diction) may properly be asserted in federal court.36 First, the federal 
claim that provides the independent basis for jurisdiction must have 
"substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction."37 Second, 
the federal and non-federal claims must "derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact."38 
36. Gibbs, 383 u.s. at 725. A lively debate has developed over whether the Gibbs 
test is two-pronged or three-pronged. This debate has arisen because Justice Brennan, after 
noting the "substantiality" and "common nucleus" factors, added: "But if, considered 
without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substanti-
ality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole." Id. Three 
distinguished commentators, relying on the "ordinarily be expected to try" language, main-
tain that this element is cumulative to the other two factors, and thus constitutes a third 
criteria. 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3567.1, at 116 (2d ed. 1984); accord. Norbert J. Bissonette. Note, Pendent Party Jurisdic-
tion: The Demise o/a Doctrine?, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 361,364-65 (1977-78); Mouchawar, 
supra note 35, at 1619-21 (referring to this third factor as the "single trial expectancy" 
standard). 
But other commentators are equally certain that Gibbs announced only a two-pronged 
test, with the above quoted sentence serving as an alternative formulation. E.g., Joan 
Baker, Toward a Relaxed View 0/ Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 759,764-65 (1972); accord, William D. Claster, Comment, Pendent and Ancillary 
Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis 0/ Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1272 (1975). 
Still other scholars view the trial expectation language as "surplusage, used only to give 
content to the common nucleus test." Matasar, supra note 9, at 139; see also Mengler, 
supra note 9, at 274. 
The Supreme Court itself has not resolved this ambiguity nor has it acknowledged the 
underlying debate. Its recent descriptions of the Gibbs opinion could be read to support 
any of these interpretations. See. e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Car-
negie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,349 (1988). In the legislative history accompa-
nying the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Congress adopted a two-
pronged test, based on its interpretation of the Gibbs case, for the purpose of awarding 
attorney fees in actions involving supplemental claims. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976). The federal courts have followed this interpretation of Gibbs in 
construing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. See generally MARY F. 
DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ArrORNEY FEES ~ 12.03 (1991). 
37. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
38. Id. 
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In 1974, eight years after Gibbs, the Court clarified the first prong 
of the test by explaining more precisely what it meant by a claim of 
"sufficient substance." In Hagans v. Lavine, 39 the Court held that this 
standard required only that the federal claim be one that is not "obvi-
ously frivolous," or "absolutely devoid of merit," or "wholly insub-
stantial."4O The relatively low quantum of "federalness" needed to 
satisfy this minimal requirement led Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in 
Hagans, to characterize the standard as permitting jurisdiction when-
ever the "plaintiff is able to plead his claim with a straight face."41 
39. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 
40. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). When the defendant inoves to dismiss the com-
plaint because the federal question is "insubstantial" or "frivolous," the court, in ruling on 
that motion, looks only to the plaintiff's allegations. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 
(1970). Thus, the plaintiff need not demonstrate jurisdiction "over the primary claim at all 
stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim." Id. at 405. This approach is 
little more than an application of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which the Court has 
applied to resolve subject matter jurisdiction questions. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. 
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (jurisdictional amount); Metcalfv. Watertown, 128 U.S. 
586 (1888) ("arising under" questions); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824) 
(diversity of citizenship). In each of these cases, the Court relied on Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), in holding that jurisdiction depends "on the 
state of things when the action is brought." Id. at 824. That "after vesting, it cannot be 
ousted by subsequent events." Mollan, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539; cf. Mosher v. City of 
Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29, 30 (1932) ("Jurisdiction is thus determined by the allegations of the 
[complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or by a decision of the merits."). The 
Court recently reaffirmed this settled rule in Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 
III S. Ct. 858, 860 (1991) (per curiam) ("We have consistently held that if jurisdiction 
exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subse-
quent events.") . 
. In view of a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, the rule 
might have been the other way, that is, that federal court jurisdiction could be "ousted by 
subsequent events." Section 5 of the 1875 Act required dismissal of a suit commenced in or 
removed to federal court "at any time after such suit has been brought [if the suit] does not 
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction" 
of the court. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added); see 
generally Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877) (federal court suit may 
be dismissed if it later appears that disposition of the case does not depend upon the con-
struction of federal law or the Constitution). Even though that language remained in the 
United States Code until 1948, when it was removed "as unnecessary," the Supreme Court 
nonetheless adhered to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule through those years. HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
1705 (3d ed. 1988). The Supreme Court has also held, however, that other jurisdictional 
attacks, such as the absence of a justiciable controversy (e.g., standing to sue or mootness), 
remain open throughout the litigation and are subject to later developments. E.g., County 
of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness). 
41. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because Justice Rehnquist 
thought the jurisdiction-conferring constitutional claim was so weak and insubstantial, he 
quipped that "this seems to be a classic case of the statutory tail wagging the constitutional 
dog." Id. Indeed some of the earlier precedents required that the federal question be "real 
and substantial," which seemed to impose something more than the minimal test of Ha-
gans. McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 181 (1899). The formulation in McCain de-
10 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14: 1 
One of the puzzling points in Gibbs was its placing the doctrine of 
supplemental jurisdiction on Article III grounds, without regard to 
any jurisdictional statute. Both before and after Gibbs, the Supreme 
Court referred to the doctrine as judicially created.42 In Murphy v. 
John Hofman CO.,43 a pre-Gibbs decision, the Court held: 
Where a court of competent jurisdiction has taken property into its 
possession, through its officers, the property is thereby withdrawn 
from the jurisdiction of all other courts. The court having posses-
sion of the property, has an ancillary jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine all questions respecting the title, possession or control of the 
property. In the courts of the United States this ancillary jurisdic-
tion may be exercised, though it is not authorized by any statute.44 
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,4s a post-Gibbs 
decision, the Court noted that "pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made 
doctrine inferred from the general language 9f Article 111."46 Later in 
the same opinion, Justice Powell observed that "pendent jurisdiction is 
a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the 
general Article III language conferring power to hear all 'cases' arising 
under federal law or between' diverse parties. "47 
rived from the general federal question jurisdictional statute, enacted in 1875, which 
authorized the federal trial courts to dismiss an original suit or remand a removed suit to 
the state court if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of said [federal] court, at any time after 
such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substan-
tially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said [federal] 
court." Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added). Although 
this provision was omitted from the 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code "as unneces-
sary," the federal courts continued to apply the substantiality test after 1948. HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 1705 (quoting from the legislative history of the recodifica-
tion). Perhaps that omission underlays Justice Harlan's observation that the standard is "a 
maxim more ancient than analytically sound." Rosado v. Wyman, ,397 U.S. 397, 404 
(1970). 
42. See generally Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common 
Law. Federal Jurisdictional Policy. and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent 
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291 (1986) (exploring the concept of judi-
cially created rules of jurisdiction in a broader context). 
43. 211 U.S. 562 (1909). The Court's holding in Murphy derived from its earlier 
decision in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861). 
44. Murphy, 211 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). The newly enacted § 1367 combines 
"ancillary jurisdiction" with "pendent jurisdiction" to form "supplemental jurisdiction." 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). See Appendix A. 
45. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
46. Id. at 117. 
47. Id. at 120. In relying on "the general Article III language" as the basis for 
supplemental jurisdiction, the Court has not drawn any distinction between "cases" and 
"controversies," the critical words in Article III. Arguably "cases" could have a narrower 
meaning than "controversies" since "cases" are tied to federal sources of law, while "con-
troversies" refer to disputes involving designated parties. Thus, an Article III "case" ar-
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In judicially creating supplemental jurisdiction and placing it on 
Article III grounds, the Supreme Court altered the usual jurisdictional 
analysis it has articulated through the years in two significant respects. 
First, the Court has insisted that lower federal courts address non-
constitutional state or federal grounds of decision before addressing 
constitutional questions.48 In Burton v. United States,49 the Court 
stated that "[i]t is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a 
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the 
case."SO If the jurisdictional statute in Gi~bs (the Taft-Hartley Act) 
did not authorize supplemental jurisdiction, then the Court did not 
have to address the scope of a "constitutional case" in Article III.Sl 
The Court never addressed this statutory question. 
Second, the Court has long stated that the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court,S2 is governed by statute. In 1799, the Court stated that "[t]he 
political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a 
few specified instances) belongs to congress, ... [and] congress is not 
bound . . . to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every 
subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant."S3 Al-
most 150 years ago, the Court held that federal courts "must look to 
the statute as the warrant for their authority; certainly they cannot go 
guably is only as broad as the federal claim or question' (including the facts or transaction 
upon which it is· based) that confers the jurisdiction, while an Article III "cOntroversy" 
could include the whole range of claims and questions that are in dispute between desig-
nated parties that determine jurisdiction. 
Recently, in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), the Court sought to recon-
struct the judicially created doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction upon a statutory footing. 
See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Finley case. 
48. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (federal statutory ground); Siler 
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (state law ground). 
49. 196 U.S. 283 (1905). 
50. Id. at 295; accord Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 
(1946); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930). 
51. See generally Shakman, supra note 35. 
52. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The Court stated: 
The principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of 
all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus established, it was an almost 
necessary consequence that acts of Congress, providing for the exercise of juris-
diction, should come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts 
making exceptions to the constitutional grant of it. 
Id. at 513. 
For the view that the Constitution limits the power of Congress to control the exercise 
of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, see generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Con-
stitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981). For the status of the current debate between these 
two positions, see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 379-87. 
53. Turner v. Bank of North Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799). 
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beyond the statute, and assert an authority with which they may not 
be invested by it, or which may be clearly denied to them. "54 In 
Gibbs, the Supreme Court ignored the statutory basis for jurisdiction 
in the federal courts and moved directly to the scope of an Article III 
"case." 
In any event, for ten years after the 1966 ruling in Gibbs, the 
lower federal courts liberally followed its teachings. In a wide variety 
of cases, the district judges permitted litigants to join separate claims 
in one lawsuit if they met the Gibbs criteria. 55 Some courts applied the 
generous Gibbs test to cases in which new parties were brought into 
the litigation. For example, in Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Sur. CO.,56 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
third party defendant in a diversity suit could assert a claim against a 
non-diverse plaintiff. 57 
c. Erosion of the Doctrine 
In a series of decisions beginning in 1976, however, the Supreme 
Court started restricting supplemental jurisdiction. While adhering to 
the general contours of Gibbs, the Court held that the broad reach of 
Gibbs would be limited where Congress, by statute, has so indicated. 
For example, in Aldinger v. Howard,58 the Court held that a plaintiff 
may not invoke supplemental jurisdiction to assert a state law claim 
against a county government that is not already a party to a lawsuit 
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.59 Similarly, in Owen Equipment & Erec-
tion Co. v. Kroger,60 the Court held that the plaintiff in a diversity suit 
may not invoke supplemental jurisdiction to assert a state law claim 
against an impleaded third party defendant if diversity of citizenship 
does not exist between them under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.61 
The erosion of supplemental jurisdiction continued in Finley v. 
United States. 62 In Finley, the Court refused to permit the plaintiff, 
suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
54. Cary v. Curtis, 44 u.s. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). 
55. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 3567.2; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, 
§ 5.4. 
56. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). 
57. Id. at 715-16. Eight years later, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a 
diversity suit could not assert a claim against a non-diverse third party defendant, even 
though that defendant could assert a claim against the plaintiff. Owen Equip. & Erection 
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
58. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
59. Id. at 16-19. 
60. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
61. Id. at 373-77. 
62. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
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to join a non-diverse entity as a defendant and assert a state law claim 
against it. 63 The Court reached this result even though federal juris-
diction is exclusive in flCA cases,64 and even though the federal 
courts largely apply state law in such suits.65 Indeed, in Finley, the 
Court appeared to cast doubt on the Gibbs case itself, suggesting that 
congressional authorization is necessary, at least where new parties are 
joined, before the courts may invoke supplemental jurisdiction. The 
Court stated that where existing parties seek to bring new persons into 
the lawsuit, it would not presume that supplemental jurisdiction 
would extend to the limits of Article 111.66 
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Finley, some lower 
federal courts restricted the reach of supplemental jurisdiction. In 
Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 67 for example, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff may not assert a state 
law claim for negligence against a person not already a party to a law 
suit arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.68 Similarly, 
in Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp. ,69 
the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could not, in the absence of 
diversity, assert a claim against a third person, not already in the law-
suit, to enforce a state based property lien in an action arising under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.'0 
In contrast, other federal courts were more generous in reading 
the Finley opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit per-
mitted pendent party claims based on state law in suits grounded in 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'1 Furthermore, in some cases, 
63. /d. at 554-56. 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) provides that, in FICA cases, "the district courts ... 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States." Id. 
65. Section 1346(b) further provides that the district courts, in FICA cases, shall 
apply "the law of the place where the act or omission [giving rise to govemmentalliability] 
occurred." Id. With some exceptions, this means that state law ordinarily applies in 
FICA cases. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); cf. Berkovitz v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988). 
66. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549. One could argue that Congress implicitly adopted the 
broad Gibbs approach to supplemental jurisdiction in every jurisdictional statute enacted or 
amended since the Gibbs decision in 1966. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375,384-86 (1983), seems to support that theory. In Herman & MacLean, the Court stated 
that congressional reenactment of a statutory scheme, in the face of numerous judicial 
precedents, could be seen as a ratification of "well established judicial interpretation." Id. 
at 385-86. See Mengler, supra note 9, at 260-67, for an exploration and rejection of this 
adoption or ratification theory. 
67. 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990). 
68. Id. at 301-03. 
69. 891 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3272 (1990). 
70. Id. at 550-52. 
71. Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989). The new statute, 
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the courts simply disagreed on the point whether a particular statute 
authorized supplemental jurisdiction. Interpreting the same statutory 
language in the same context, federal courts came to different conclu-
sions on the scope of such jurisdiction.72 The most favorable reading 
of these cases was that the courts will address the question of supple-
mental jurisdiction on a statute-by-statute basis, a time-consuming and 
expensive process with uneven results. 
The one point upon which courts and commentators agreed, how-
ever, was that the decision in Finley was a genuine and substantial 
threat to the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. For example, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that after Finley "the contin-
ued viability of the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction in any con-
text is seriously in question."73 A district court in Louisiana noted 
that the impact of Finley "on supplemental jurisdiction in general is 
potentially far-reaching."74 Legal scholars also expressed alarm at the 
thrust of the Finley decision. President Lee, a member of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, and Professor Wilkens wrote: "Similar rea-
soning, applied to other jurisdictional statutes, would have a devastat-
ing effect on the availability of supplemental jurisdiction. "75 In his 
frank and perceptive assessment of the law after Finley, Professor 
Mengler observed: "Supplemental jurisdiction, therefore, is arguably 
dead and surely expiring. "76 
To prevent further erosion of supplemental jurisdiction, congres-
sional action was necessary. In light of the Supreme Court's recent 
curtailing of such jurisdiction and the lower federal courts' confusion 
about the reach of the Finley case, Congress sought to remove the 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), may overrule this holding to the extent it is a suit involving a foreign 
sovereign based solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991); 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1988). 
72. Compare Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1990) (disallow-
ing pendent party claim for loss of consortium under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with Rodriguez v. 
Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing pendent party claim for loss of consortium 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). . 
73. Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg Express, 899 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 
1990). 
74. Community Coffee Co. v. MIS Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 774 (E.D. La. 
1989). 
75. Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and 
Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 321, 330. 
See generally Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Re-
form Act: Hearings on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before.the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellec-
tual Property, and the Administr,ation of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, IOlst 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
76. Mengler, supra note 9, at 248. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 3567.2, at 
27-28 (Supp. 1991). 
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uncertainty by codifying the law as it existed before the recent curtail-
ment. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Finley essen-
tially invited congressional action. 77 
Furthermore, supplemental jurisdiction is a by-product of an im-
portant goal of modern civil procedure to join in a single civil action as 
many claims and parties as feasible in the interest of "judicial econ-
omy, convenience and fairness to litigants."78 Without congressional 
action, the courts would have continued eviscerating supplemental ju-
risdiction and thus undermined this important goal. An emasculated 
doctrine would have resulted in duplicative or overlapping litigation in 
state and federal courts. If parties cannot litigate all of their claims in 
the federal forum, they will confront the hard choice of whether to 
split their claims between state and federal courts, or take the entire 
dispute to a state court. If federal jurisdiction on the federal claim is 
exclusive, then splitting the claims will be the only avenue for relief as 
in the Finley case. In addition, the Finley case had resulted, and 
would have continued to result, in extended litigation over the ques-
tion whether particular statutes do or do not authorize supplemental 
jurisdiction. At a time of docket congestion in all courts, litigants 
could not afford these additional expenditures of time, money, and 
other resources. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
To appreciate the evolution of the proposal to codify supplemen-
tal jurisdiction as it moved through Congress, two broad inquiries 
need to be made. First, Section II of this Article will examine the 
history of section 120 of House Bill 538l,19 the bill that eventually 
became the "Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 
1990. "80 Second, this Section will explore three areas of the legislative 
development where the proposed provision for supplemental jurisdic-
tion in House Bill 5381 differed significantly from the final product 
embodied in section 1367 as enacted. The first area to be discussed is 
the section 1367 provision defining the general scope of supplemental 
77. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). 
78. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In C¥negie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), the Court added "comity" to "judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness" as values that inform the scope and exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction, although the Gibbs decision did make reference to the impact of the doctrine 
on federalism. Id. at 350. 
79. H.R. REP. No. 734, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6860 and in. Hearings, supra note 75, at 315. 
80. Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5089, 5104 (1990) (to be codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
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jurisdiction. The next area to be discussed is the assignment of discre-
tion to the judges in determining the scope and exercise of the author-
ity conferred by section 1367. Finally, Section II will examine the 
broad exception for diversity cases. 
A. History of Section 120 of House Bill 5381 
The impetus for section 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction provi-
sion, came from recent Supreme Court decisions restricting supple-
mental jurisdiction8 } and from the Report of the Federal Courts Study 
Committee.82 The Report recommended "that Congress expressly au-
thorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same 'trans-
action or occurrence' as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including 
claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of 
additional parties, namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has 
a closely related state claim. "83 In their letter to Representative Kas-
tenmeier, the authors of the original proposal stated: "Recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, eroding the doctrine of supplemental 
jurisdiction, have generated strong support for codification. . .. If we 
are to arrest that [erosion] and breathe new life into the doctrine, ur-
gent action by Congress is needed. "84 
Section 1367 progressed through four stages of development 
before enactment: first, the original proposal submitted to Representa-
tive Kastenmeier on June 8, 1990;85 second, the text of the proposed 
section 1367 contained in section 120 of House Bill 5381,86 the bill 
Representative Kastenmeier introduced on July 26, 1990; third, the 
amendments to the bill recommended by the witnesses at the congres-
sional hearing on September 6, 1990,87 and by Professors Rowe, Bur-
bank, and Mengler on September 11, 1990 (hereinafter Rowe-
81. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686-91 (Wolf-Egnal proposal). See generally STUDY 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. II, Working Papers and Subcommittee 
Repons 546-68 (1990) (section on pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in the Report of the 
Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation to the States, for which 
Professor Larry Kramer served as the reporter). 
82. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47-48. 
83. Id. at 47. 
84. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686 (letter of June 8, 1990, to Representative Kas-
tenmeier from Professor Wolf). 
85. Id. See Appendix B for text of the Wolf-Egnal proposal. 
86. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2, 28-33. See Appendix C for text of H.R. 5381, 
section 120. 
87. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98, 155-56, 224-26, 735. See Appendix D for text of 
the Weis proposal. 
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Burbank-Mengler proposal);88 and fourth, the final version of section 
1367 that became public law. The principal comparison should be 
made between House Bill 5381 as introduced in Congress and as it 
emerged from the subcommittee on September 13th, which became 
section 1367 as enacted. 
After the release on April 2, 1990, of the Report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, the four members of Congress89 who had 
served on the Federal Courts Study Committee directed their staffs to 
prepare a bill that would include the "noncontroversial"90 recommen-
dations of the Study Committee.91 They defined "noncontroversial" 
to include those Study Committee recommendations to which none of 
them had objected, and which they anticipated would not draw signifi-
cant opposition.92 Simultaneously with the work of the subcommittee 
staff, Professors Wolf and Egnal93 prepared a draft supplemental juris-
diction statute based on the prior case law and the Report of the Study 
Committee. By letter dated June 8, 1990,94 they sent their proposal to 
Representative Kastenmeier,95 a member of the Study Committee and 
chair of the House JUdiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration of Justice.96 Three members97 of 
88. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722. See Appendix E for text of the Rowe-Burbank-
Mengler proposal. 
89. The four members were Representatives Robert W. Kastenmeier and Carlos J. 
Moorhead, and Senators Charles E. Grassley and Howell Heflin. 
90. Hearings, supra note 75, at 103. 
91. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. Mr. Geyh served as counsel to the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Jus-
tice during this period and was assigned to this bill. Mr. Geyh is currently a Professor of 
Law at Widener University, Harrisburg, Pa. 
92. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. For example, based on this definition, the 
recommendation to repeal the general diversity jurisdictional statute did not qualify as 
"noncontroversial" because Senator Grassley disagreed with that proposal, and because it 
had generated significant opposition in the past. STUDY COMMfITEE REPORT, supra note 
3, pt. II, at 42. Furthermore, Senator Grassley described the contents of the bill in a differ-
ent way, including "only those consensus items that enjoyed unanimous support among 
study committee members." 136 CoNG. REc. S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
93. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
94. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686. 
95. For many years, Representative Kastenmeier served as the chair of the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee for Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Jus-
tice. His interest in and devotion to matters affecting the federal courts are well known and 
greatly admired by aficionados of the federal judicial system. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325 
(1991); Charles G. Geyh, Complex Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. 
LITIG. 401 (1991). In November, 1990, Representative Kastenmeier suffered an unex-
pected defeat in the congressional elections of that year. Representative William J. Hughes 
now serves as chair of that subcommittee. 
96. Professors Wolf and Egnal also sent the proposal to Senator Joseph Biden, chair 
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the Study Committee opposed the recommendation to codify supple-
mental jurisdiction to the extent it embraced "pendent party jurisdic-
tion,"98 which furnished cause for concern that the proposal might 
attract opposition.99 However, the Wolf-Egnalletter prompted Repre-
sentative Kastenmeier to revisit the issue and to include the Wolf-
Egnal proposal, as modified, in the draft bill, House Bill 5381.100 On 
July 26, 1990, Representative Kastenmeier and Representative Moor-
head, the other member of the House who served on the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, introduced House Bill 5381, which con-
tained the supplemental jurisdiction proposal in section 120 of the bill. 
On September 6, 1990, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice held a 
one day hearing on House Bill 5381 and related bills. Some of the 
witnesses addressed the supplemental jurisdiction provision. Assistant 
Attorney General Stuart Gerson, representing the United States De-
partment of Justice, opposed the entire section of House Bill 5381 that 
would codify supplemental jurisdiction. 101 Judge Deanell Tachs, chair 
of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, testified 
in favor of the supplemental jurisdiction provision recommending 
"three minor changes."I02 Judge Joseph Weis, Jr., testified as the for-
mer chair of the Federal Courts Study Committee.103 He too sup-
ported the supplemental jurisdiction provision, but recommended the 
adoption of the three changes offered by the Judicial Conference and 
amendments relating to diversity cases. 104 Alan Morrison, represent-
ing Public Citizen Litigation Group (the Ralph Nader litigators), 
"strongly support[ed] the supplemental jurisdictional provisions"lOs of 
House Bill 5381 ,with some suggestions for amendment. 106 
After the hearing on September 6, 1990, the subcommittee pre-
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senator Howell Heflin, chair of the relevant Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee. 
97. Judge Levin H. Campbell, Morris Harrell, Esq., and Diana Gribbon Motz, Esq. 
98. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 48. 
99. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. 
100. Id. 
101. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 201. 
102. Hearings, supra note 7S, at ISS. The three changes were to delete the require-
ments in the bill that would: (1) impose a ninety-day limit on deciding whether the supple-
mental claims should remain in the case; (2) require the district judge to give the reasons 
for dismissing any supplemental claim; and (3) direct the judges to certify state law ques-
tions to state courts in certain circumstances. Id. at ISS-S6, 73S. 
103. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 86. 
104. Id. at 9S, 96, 98. 
lOS. Id. at 224. 
106. Id. at 216-17, 22S-28. 
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pared a substitute for section 120 of House Bill 5381 based on the 
hearings I;lnd subsequent discussions with its consultants, primarily 
Professors Rowe, Burbank, Mengler, and Kramer. 107 On September 
13th, the subcommittee met and favorably reported House Bill 5381 
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. 108 The substitute 
tracked largely the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal of September 
11th. On September 18, 1990, the Judiciary Committee by voice vote 
reported House Bill 5381 favorably with an amendment in the nature 
of a substitute. 109 On the same day, Representative Jack Brooks, chair 
of the House Judiciary Committee, filed the Committee Report. llo 
House Bill 5381 passed the House on September 27, 1990. 
The Senate did not take up the matter until October 27, 1990. 
While considering Senate Bill 2648 (the "Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990"), Senator Biden, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
and Senator Thurmond, the ranking minority member, offered an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute that converted Senate Bill 
2648 from a two title bill to an eight title bill. III The text of House 
Bill 5381 became Title III of the omnibus bill, the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990. 112 Title III of the Biden-Thurmond substitute re-
tained the short title in the House bill, "Federal Courts Study 
Committee Implementation Act of 1990." 1\3 Before the Senate voted 
on Senate Bill 2648, Senator Biden offered its text as a substitute for 
the text of House Bill 5316, the House bill creating additional judge-
ships that became the vehicle for the omnibus bill. 114 The Senate 
passed House Bill 5316 on October 27, 1990, and the House passed it 
107. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 
27 n.13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6873. 
108. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6861. The legislative history in the Senate of the supplemental jurisdiction proposal is 
limited to Senator Grassley's statement on the floor of the Senate, which essentially tracks 
parts of the House Report. Ij~ CONGo REc. SI7577-17583 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
109. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 15-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6860-61. 
110. The date of "September 10, 1990," which is on the official print of the House 
Report, supra note 79, is a typographical error. It should read "September 18, 1990." 
Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler acted as the principal consultants in the drafting 
of the House Report. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See also H.R. REp. No. 734, 
supra note 79, at 27 n.13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6873. 
111. 136 CONGo REc. S17570, S17574 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990). For the text of the 
Biden-Thunnond amendment, No. 3204, see 136 CONGo REc. S17904-18 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 
1990). 
112. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
113. 136 CONGo REc. S17908 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990). 
114. Id. at SI7583-84. 
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later the same day.1l5 The President approved the bill on December 1, 
1990. 116 
Section 120 of House Bill 5381 had several goals. These goals 
were: to define supplemental jurisdiction as precisely as possible; to 
authorize such jurisdiction broadly, but stop short of the full reach of 
Article III judicial power; to permit the invocation of supplemental 
jurisdiction uniformly by all persons and parties to federal lawsuits, 
with one narrow exception in diversity cases; to circumscribe the dis-
cretion of federal judges to entertain or dismiss supplemental claims; 
and to reassert the power of Congress as the principal actor in defining 
the nature and scope of federal court jurisdiction, including supple-
mental jurisdiction. As enacted, the supplemental jurisdiction provi-
sion of section 1367 altered these goals (and House Bill 5381) in three 
significant ways. First, it broadened the scope of supplemental juris-
diction generally. Second, it maximized judicial discretion in exercis-
ing supplemental jurisdiction and minimized statutory safeguards. 
Third, it severely limited the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diver-
sity cases. The following materials trace the proposal through the leg-
islative process, focusing on these three areas. 
B. General Scope of Supplemental Jurisdiction 
As introduced by Representative Kastenmeier, House Bill 5381 
defined the general scope of supplemental jurisdiction by requiring the 
person or party asserting the supplemental claim to meet a two-
pronged test. In determining whether the district court has the power 
to entertain the supplemental claim, the plaintiff must meet two crite-
ria: that the jurisdiction-conferring claim not be insubstantial and that 
the jurisdiction-conferring and supplemental claims arise out of the 
same transaction or occurrence. Both prongs derive from the Gibbs 
case. Some commentators believe Gibbs established a three prong test: 
the two noted above plus a showing that the jurisdiction-conferring 
and supplemental claims would ordinarily be tried in one lawsuit. 117 
Under House Bill 5381, as introduced, this third prong would not 
have been a factor in determining initially whether the district court 
had the power to entertain the supplemental claim. Rather, this third 
prong would provide a basis for the district judge, in the exercise of 
discretion, to dismiss the supplemental claim after the court deter-
115. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(104 Stat.) 5089, 5137. 
116. Id. 
117. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
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mined that it "should be tried separately."1l8 
With regard to the first prong, the jurisdiction-conferring claim 
(the "federal" or "anchor" claim, as it is sometimes called) must not 
be "insubstantial."1l9 The second prong required that the "federal"120 
and "non-federal"121 claims "arise out of the same transaction or oc-
currence or series of transactions or occurrences."122 In adopting the 
phrases "federal" and "non-federal" claims, House Bill 5381 utilized 
the terminology the Supreme Court employed in the Kroger case. 123 
The "common transaction" formulation of House Bill 5381 differed 
from Gibbs which used the phrase "common nucleus of operative 
fact" to describe the relationship between the federal and non-federal 
claims. 124 The "same transaction or occurrence" language came from 
the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee125 and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 126 It was not intended to "reach 
118. Subsection (c)(3) of § 1367 contained in § 120 of H.R. 5381 as introduced on 
July 26, 1990. Hearings, supra note 75, at 30. 
119. Subsection (a)(I)(A) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381. Hearings, supra note 75, 
at 29. In the Gibbs case, the Court simply required that the "federal claim have substance 
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court." United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). It did not define the concept of "substantiality" any 
further. Eight years later, the Court held that the jurisdiction-conferring ("federal") claim 
need only be a claim that is not "obviously frivolous," "absolutely devoid of merit," or 
"wholly insubstantial." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations omitted). 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974). The low 
quantum of "federalness" the Court allowed to confer jurisdiction led Justice Rehnquist in 
dissent to observe that, under this standard, the plaintiff need only "plead his claim with a 
straight face." Hagans, 415 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
120. Subsection (g)(I) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381 defined "Federal claim" as 
"any claim that has an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district 
courts." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. This section was later omitted after the September 
6, 1990, hearing. 
121. Subsection (g)(2) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381 defined "non-Federal" as 
"any claim that does not have an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in 
the district courts." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. This subsection was omitted after the 
September 6, 1990, hearing. 
122. Subsection (a)(I)(B) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381. Hearings, supra note 75, 
at 29. 
123. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.ll (1978). 
124. Whatever differences there may be in the meaning of these two phrases, the 
"common transaction" language has a more ancient and familiar pedigree than "common 
nucleus." See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); RULES OF 
PRAcrICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES, Rule 30,226 U.S. 627, 
657 (1912). 
125. In proposing that Congress expressly authorize supplemental jurisdiction, the 
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended the use of the phrase "same transaction or 
occurrence." STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47. See generally Hear-
ings, supra note 75, at 692. 
126. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure employ that expression in Rules 10 (b), 
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as far as Article III allows."127 
At the hearing on September 6, no witness objected to the general 
definition of supplemental jurisdiction contained in subsection (a)(I) 
that set forth the two-pronged test. Although Judge Weis offered an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute for the supplemental jurisdic-
tion provision in House Bill 5381, his substitute for the general 
("power") provision tracked closely the language of House Bill 5381. 
His proposal authorized supplemental jurisdiction "over all other 
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences."128 
In a proposal submitted to the subcommittee on September II, 
1990, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler l29 suggested that the 
provision be broadened to permit supplemental jurisdiction to the full 
reach of Article III of the United States Constitution. Their proposal 
extended the jurisdiction to "all other claims that are so related to 
claims within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."130 
Interestingly, in the original proposal to Representative Kastenmeier 
on June 8, 1990, Professors Wolf and Egnal recommended, in the al-
ternative, that the supplemental jurisdiction provision in House Bill 
5381 be as broad as the Constitution allows. t31 House Bill 5381, as 
introduced, included the narrower provision (the "same transaction or 
occurrence" formulation), which mirrored the recommendation of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee. 132 
At its September 13, 1990, markup, the subcommittee opted for 
the broader provision contained in the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler propo-
sal of September II, 1990. At this point, the supplemental jurisdiction 
l3(a), 13(b), l3(g), l4(a), 14(c), IS(c), IS(d), and 20(a). See generally Hearings, supra note 
7S, at 692. 
127. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 692. 
128. Id. at 98. 
129. Professor Rowe had served as a reporter to the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at Preface. Judge Weis also consulted 
with Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler, together with Professor Larry Kramer (who 
had also served as a reporter to the Study Committee), as he prepared his testimony for the 
September 6, 1990, hearing. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See also Hearings, supra 
note 7S, at 9S. 
130. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722. 
131. Id. at 687, 692. Both the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler and the Wolf-Egnal propos-
als trace their ancestry to the Gibbs decision, which required, as the basis generally for 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction, that "the relationship between [the federal] claim and 
the [non-federal] claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional 'case.''' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 71S, 725 
(1966). 
132. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47. 
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provision took final shape. The Committee Report states that the gen-
eral provision "codifies the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court"l33 in the Gibbs case. Together with 
the language of the statute, this reference presumably states congres-
sional intent to authorize the courts to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion as far as Article III allows. Thus, the statute eliminates any gap 
that may exist between "the same transaction or occurrence" formula-
tion and the constitutional limits of Article III. Neither the final ver-
sion of subsection (a) of section 1367 (the "power" section) nor its 
legislative history addresses the point of whether the courts are to ap-
ply a two-pronged or a three-pronged test in determining the power 
question. House Bill 5381, as introduced, sought to clarify that point 
by expressly codifying a two-pronged test, while the final version of 
section 1367 obscured it. 
C. Judicial Discretion 
In addition to expanding the reach of supplemental jurisdiction, 
section 1367, as enacted, also gave judges considerably more discretion 
than under House Bill 5381, as introduced. The original version of 
House Bill 5381 had several provisions that sought to circumscribe the 
discretion of the courts in entertaining supplemental claims. Four ar-
eas merit attention: the "power" provision authorizing supplemental 
jurisdiction; discretionary authority to dismiss supplemental claims; 
certification of state law questions to state courts; and supersession of 
federal "common law" development of jurisdiction. 
1. Power Provision 
Subsection (a) of section 1367 delegates to the judiciary the au-
thority to define the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. As noted 
above, House Bill 5381 would have restricted supplemental jurisdic-
tion to the "same transaction" formula, with all its attendant history 
and precedents from the decisions under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and ancillary jurisdiction. If Congress had enacted section 
1367 as contained in section 120 of House Bill 5381, as introduced, the 
discretion left to the judiciary would have been considerably less than 
under the Act as passed. Under the new section 1367, the courts will 
define the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in each case. Since the 
test of the reach of subsection (a) will be the scope of Article III, the 
judges will need to address the constitutional question in each in-
133. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29 n.15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6875. 
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stance. Historically, Congress has defined the scope of federal court 
jurisdiction.134 However, this provision would reverse that role by 
delegating to the courts the power to determine their jurisdiction in 
cases involving supplemental claims. Congress should be loathe to as-
sign such broad law-creating or interpretative authority to judges. 135 
2. Discretionary Dismissal 
In the Gibbs decision, the Supreme Court, after defining the scope 
of pendent jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, held that 
the "power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to 
exist."136 In short, the Court stated that district courts have discretion 
to dismiss supplemental claims even though they have the power to 
entertain them. House Bill 5381, as introduced, sought to control the 
exercise of such discretion by defining clearly the criteria for discre-
tionary dismissals, by requiring the district judge to provide written 
reasons for such dismissals, and by imposing a limit on the time period 
for exercising that discretion. 
a. Criteria for Dismissal 
In Gibbs, the Court identified three instances when the district 
court should exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the 
supplemental claim: (1) if the federal claim (the jurisdiction-confer-
ring claim) is "dismissed before trial"; 137 (2) if the non-federal ques-
tions (usually, but not, always, state law issues) "substantially 
predominate"; 138 and (3) if circumstances exist that would "justify 
separating state and federal claims for trial"139 under Rule 42(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subsection (c) of the proposed sec-
tion 1367 in section 120 of House Bill 5381, as introduced, codified 
these three exceptions to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, 
seeking to confine the power of discretionary dismissal, identified in 
Gibbs, to these three instances. 
The substitute offered by Judge Weis at the September 6, 1990, 
134. See supra notes 52-54. 
135. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme 
Court interpreted § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a) (1988), as authorizing the federal courts to create a federal common law of con-
tracts in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in industries affecting com-
merce. Id. at 449-50. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986). 
136. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
137. [d. 
138. Id. 
139. [d. at 727. 
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hearing contained four grounds for discretionary dismissal: when the 
supplemental claim "raises a novel or complex issue of State law";I40 
when the non-feder~l claim "predominates" over the federal claim; 141 
when the judge has dismissed the federal claim; 142 and when "there 
are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness to the litigants, for declining jurisdiction,"143 a catch-all 
basis for dismissal. The Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal of Septem-
ber 11 th also contained these four bases for dismissal. 144 Although the 
hearings do not reflect it, other consultants to the subcommittee criti-
cized the Weis substitute after the hearing on September 6th. 145 They 
thought the discretion given to judges under the substitute to dismiss 
the non-federal claims was too broad. Consequently, the sub-
committee made two changes. They reinserted "substantially" back 
into the phrase "substantially predominates,"I46 and narrowed consid-
erably the catch-all exception by restricting it to "exceptional circum-
stances [when] there are other compelling reasons for declining 
jurisdiction." 147 
But these two changes did not address the more fundamental 
question of whether the district judge should dismiss a supplemental 
claim simply because it "raises a novel or complex issue of State 
140. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. In his testimony, Judge Weis did not explain the 
basis for this ground of dismissal. It apparently came from a position paper prepared for 
the Federal Courts Study Committee. STUDY CoMMfITEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, 
vol. II, at 561-63,568. As introduced, subsection (f) of the proposed § 1367 in H.R. 5381 
addressed this issue by requiring the district court to certify such questions to the state 
courts, retaining jurisdiction of the entire case. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31, 696. See 
also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 
(1960); Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Most states with certifica-
tion procedures will accept certified questions from federal district courts. HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 1381. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.2. 
141. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. The Weis proposal deviated from the Gibbs 
formulation in permitting a dismissal of the non-federal claim if it merely "predominated" 
over the federal claim; Gibbs required that it "substantially" predominate. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 
at 726. 
142. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. 
143. Id. at 98. Judge Weis did not identify the source of this basis, but it appears to 
be a memorandum prepared for the Federal Courts Study Committee. STUDY COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. I, at 561-63, 568. The memo in turn relies upon 
that part of the Gibbs opinion where Justice Brennan sought to support the discretionary 
power to dismiss non·federal claims: "Its justification lies in considerations of judicial 
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
144. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722. 
145. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. 
146. H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11. Thus, the subcommittee restored to 
the bill the formulation in § 120 of H.R. 5381, as introduced. See Hearings, supra note 75, 
at 30. 
147. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11. 
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law."148 To be sure, some courtsI49 have authorized such dismissals in 
the wake of the Gibbs decision. ISO These dismissals, however, may be 
inconsistent with some of the Supreme Court's decisions on absten-
tion. For example, the Court has required the federal courts to abstain 
from deciding "a novel or complex" state law issue when conjoined 
with a federal constitutional claim. In Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man CO.,ISI where the state law question was novel or unclear, the 
Court ordered a postponement of jurisdiction until the parties could 
obtain a ruling from the state court on the state law questions. IS2 Af-
ter securing a ruling from the state court, the parties could return to 
the federal court to litigate the case to completion. Is3 In contrast, 
where the state law question was "complex" and integral to a state 
regulatory scheme, as in Burford v. Sun Oil CO.,IS4 the Court ordered 
an outright dismissal of the action; requiring the plaintiff to litigate its 
state and federal claims in the state court. 
The legislative history of subsection (c)( 1) of section 1367 is silent 
on the impact of that subsection on Pullman and Burford abstention. 
By permitting the district court to dismiss outright supplemental 
claims raising "a novel or complex issue of State law," the subsection 
appears to overrule Pullman and its progeny, and codify a very expan-
sive view of Burford. The overruling of Pullman and the codification 
of Burford will come as an unpleasant surprise to federal court liti-
gators, especially of section 1983 claims, ISS who frequently include 
novel or complex state-law based claims in their federal complaints, 
and expect to litigate them in one federal proceeding. 
148. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(I) (West Supp. 1991). 
149. E.g., Pride v. Community School Bd., 482 F.2d 257, 272 (2d Cir. 1973). 
150. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
151. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman Company sued the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion to enjoin an order imposing racial segregation in passenger cars. The company based 
its claims on state law and the Federal Constitution. Id. at 498. 
152. See discussion infra Section II.C.3. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, 
§ 12.3. 
153. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.3. 
154. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Sun Oil sued to enjoin an order of the Texas Railroad 
Commission relating to oil leases that adversely affected the plaintiff's interests. Id. at 316. 
Although the decision is not clear, it appears that Sun Oil asserted claims, as did the Pull-
man Company, based on both federal and state law. Id. at 317. Professor Chemerinsky 
argues that Burford requires the state law issue to be unclear as well as complex before the 
. court will abstain (dismiss), while Professor Field contends that complexity alone is 
enough. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.2.3 n.77. 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute is widely used to challenge the legality of 
governmental 'action taken under color of state law. 
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b. Reasons for Dismissal 
To control further the exercise of judicial discretion, House Bill 
5381, as introduced, contained another device. To ensure that the 
judges cabined their discretionary dismissals to the grounds set out in 
the draft section 1367, subsection (c) required the district judge to "file 
with the order [of dismissal or remand] a written statement of the rea-
sons for the dismissal or remand."lS6 The authors of the initial propo-
sal stated: "The district court must not dismiss a non-federal claim for 
any reason other than those identified in the statute."lS7 
At the September 6 hearing, Judges Weis and Tacha objected to 
subsection (c).158 Judge Weis did not offer any reason for his view, but 
simply adopted by reference the Judicial Conference recommendation 
to delete subsection (C)}S9 Judge Tacha, speaking for the Judicial 
Conference, objected to Congress requiring district judges to file "a 
separate written statement"l60 of their reasons for dismissing the sup-
plemental claims. Judge Tacha did not object to compelling the dis-
trict courts to state the grounds for dismissal, since "the circuit [court 
of appeals] will require reasons anyway." 161 The basis for Judge 
Tacha's objection to a "separate" written statement is not clear. Sub-
section (c) simply required the court to file a written statement in some 
form to ensure that the reasons be included in a document. Further, 
since Judge Tacha did not object conceptually to requiring the judges 
to state the grounds for dismissal, he should have suggested that sub-
section (c) be amended to require merely that the district courts give 
the reasons for dismissal in whatever form deemed appropriate. Strik-
ing the entire subsection seems a bit drastic._ 
c. Time for Dismissal 
In connection with the discretionary dismissal power, subsection 
(c) also required the district courts to decide whether to retain juris-
diction over the supplemental claim within ninety days of its asser-
tion}62 This provision was based on "the need for the court and the 
parties to know early in the litigation whether the non-federal claim 
156. Hearings, supra note 75, at 30, 694. 
157. Id. at 695. Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1988), seems to require district 
judges to state their reasons for dismissing supplemental claims. Id. at 798. 
158. Hearings, supra note 75, at 96, 147, 155·56, 735. 
159. Id. at 96. 
160. Id. at 147, 735. 
161. Id. at 147. 
162. Id. at 30. 
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will remain in the law suit."163 As with the written statement require-
ment of subsection (c), Judges Weis and Tacha objected to this provi-
sion, Judge Weis again incorporating by reference the Judicial 
Conference position. l64 Judge Tacha objected because the provision 
imposed "an unrealistic time frame"165 on the litigation process. The 
Weis substitute thus omitted any reference to the ninety-day require-
ment. 166 The Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal tracked the Weis sub-
stitute in this regard. 167 The final committee version (which became 
section 1367 as enacted) thus omitted any reference to a time period in 
which to determine whether the supplemental claim(s) should remain 
in the civil action. 168 
The omission of the ninety-day provision from House Bill 5381, 
as introduced, is very unfortunate. First, its deletion further expands 
the discretion of the district court to dismiss supplemental claims by 
removing any time limits for deciding whether such claims should be 
dismissed. Under section 1367, as enacted, the federal judges may 
now dismiss supplemental claims at any time during the litigation pro-
cess, even after trial or on appeal. Under the original proposal, the 
judges would have been restricted to the ninety-day period. Indeed in 
Gibbs, the district court dismissed the last federal claim (jurisdiction-
conferring) after trial, but retained jurisdiction over and entered final 
judgment upon the supplemental claims. 169 The Supreme Court 
agreed that the district court's dismissal of the jurisdiction-conferring 
claims did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the supplemental 
claims, and agreed that judgment could be entered upon those remain-
ing claims.170 Under section 1367, the district courts or the appellate 
courts could now dismiss the supplemental claims at any time. 
Second, giving the district court greater discretion adds addi-
tional uncertainty to the litigation process in cases involving supple-
mental claims. If the district court is permitted to dismiss such claims 
at any time in the process, including after trial, the parties to the civil 
action cannot calculate accurately nor predict with any certainty the 
time and cost of litigating in the federal court. The ultimate 
nightmare, of course, is a case such as Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake 
163. Id. at 695. 
164. Id. at 96. 
165. Id. at 147. See also id. at 735 (stating that the ninety-day provision is "an 
unrealistic requirement and burden on the court's control of its docket."). 
166. Id. at 98. 
167. Id. at 722. 
168. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12. 
169. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720 (1966). 
170. Id. at 728. 
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Michigan Railway v. Swan .171 There, after ten years of litigating, first 
in the state courts and then on removal in the federal courts, the 
Supreme Court decided that the federal trial court did not have juris-
diction. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the Court ordered 
that the federal judge remand the case back to the state court where 
the parties would begin the litigation process again. 
Third, the settled rule is that jurisdiction depends "on the state of 
things when the action is brought." 172 In Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 173 
the Supreme Court held that "[j]urisdiction is thus determined by the 
allegations of the [complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or 
by a decision of the merits."174 There is no reason to postpone the 
decision to hear the supplemental claims, at least to determine if the 
court has the power to do so, beyond the initial stages of the litigation 
process. To permit discretionary dismissals at any time tends to un-
dermine the fundamental point that jurisdiction should be determined 
"when the action is brought," not "by the way the facts tum out," 
especially after the parties have expended time and money. Perhaps 
the ninety-day period in House Bill 5381 was too short; perhaps it 
should have been 180 days or some other period of time. If so, the 
provision should have been amended, not omitted. 
The important point is the scope of judicial discretion to dismiss 
supplemental claims. Permitting that discretion to persist through the 
entire litigation is counterproductive. If discovery is needed to deter-
mine whether the supplemental claims are within the scope of the stat-
ute, then the judge can order limited discovery for that purpose. In 
addition, if the parties are mistaken as to the facts underlying the sup-
plemental claims, Rule 12(h)(3) is available for a jurisdictional dismis-
sal. 175 In the Kroger case, for example, the parties thought they were 
of diverse citizenship only to find out later that they were citizens of 
the same state. Since their initial view of diverseness proved incorrect, 
the Court retained the power to dismiss the case when the true facts 
became known. 
The Supreme Court in the Gibbs case stated that the discretionary 
authority to dismiss supplemental claims "remains open throughout 
the litigation."176 But that statement was made twenty-six years ago 
171. III U.S. 379 (1884). 
172. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,824 (1824). See 
also supra note 40. 
173. 287 U.S. 29 (1932). 
174. Id. at 30. 
175. See generally FED. R. elV. P. 12(h)(3). 
176. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). 
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when federal and state court dockets were not at the current levels. If 
parties litigate a case vigorously through to the trial stage, the judge 
should not retain the discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims, 
absent discovery of facts to invoke Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Unfortunately, under section 1367, the federal 
judges may dismiss supplemental claims at any time, even after trial 
and on appeal. 
3. Certification 
Notions of federalism playa role in determining the scope and 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Since most supplemental claims 
are rooted in state law,177 the federal courts are concerned that they 
not make unnecessary rulings on state law questions. "Needless deci-
sions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to 
promote justice between the parties .... "178 By litigating supplemen-
. tal claims in state court, the parties will secure "a surer-footed reading 
of applicable law."179 Subsection (f) of House Bill 5381 called upon 
the district judges to certify certain questions of state law to the state 
courts for resolution: "The district court, in determining the nature 
and scope of any non-Federal claim based on State law, shall use any 
certification procedures available for the determination of State 
law."180 This provision was based on the Pullman abstention 
doctrine. 181 
177. Supplemental claims may also be rooted in the law of foreign states or arise out 
of federal law, where Congress has excluded those claims from the federal courts. See. e.g., 
28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988) (claims under § 11707 of title 49 must exceed $10,000 to invoke 
federal court jurisdiction); 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) (damage claims under the Consumer 
Product Safety Act must exceed $10,000 to invoke federal court jurisdiction). See also 
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). Although these claims are arguably within the 
reach of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, subsection (a) of § 1367 might exclude 
them because of the qualifying language: "Except ... as expressly provided otherwise by 
Federal statute .... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
178. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 
350 (1988). 
179. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Some commentators have suggested that state courts 
may be the better forum for the entire litigation, including both federal and state claims. 
See Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 
38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 382 (1984) ("State courts have emerged in recent years as the 
forum choice for an increasing number of plaintiffs suing state and local officials under 42 
U.S.c. § 1983.") (footnotes omitted). 
180. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. Although subsection (I) employed the words 
"shall use," the original Wolf-Egnal proposal employed the phrase "shall freely utilize" any 
available certification procedures. Id. at 688. The idea was to require the judges to employ 
certification where compelled by existing law, but to give them some discretion not to cer-
tify when the applicable precedents did not demand it. Id. at 696. 
181. The doctrine is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Railroad 
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In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,182 the plaintiff chal-
lenged a rule of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring racial segre-
gation on trains. The plaintiff based its claims on state law and federal 
constitutional law. The Supreme Court held that, if the state law 
questions are unclear or uncertain, the federal court should abstain 
from deciding them. The idea is to avoid unnecessary decisions on 
federal constitutional issues if the case can be decided on state law 
grounds. To respect the authority of the states, the Court ordered the 
district court to send the parties to state court for a decision on the 
state law questions, retaining jurisdiction over the case unless the par-
ties, in repairing to the state courts, chose to litigate the dispute on the 
merits, in whole or in part, in the state court. In the wake of the 
Pullman decision, many states adopted certification procedures to fa-
cilitate the resolution of state law questions coming to them through 
the abstention doctrine. 183 
At the September 6, 1990, hearing, Judges Weis and Tacha ob-
jected to subsection (f). 184 Judge Weis did not offer any reason for his 
view, but simply adopted by reference the Judicial Conference recom-
mendation to delete that subsection.18s Judge Tacha, speaking for the 
Judicial Conference, objected to the certification procedure because it 
would delay the processing of the case. 186 This objection to the certifi-
cation procedure may be inconsistent with the provision in Judge 
Weis' substitute (and the final version of the bill) authorizing discre-
tionary dismissals when the supplemental claim "raises a novel or 
complex issue of State law."187 
The inconsistency is this: Judges Weis and Tacha testified in 
favor of a provision authorizing dismissal at any time in the litigation 
process of supplemental claims raising "novel or complex issues" so 
that state courts could address them. In contrast, they opposed a cer-
tification procedure to accomplish the same goal without dismissal of 
the supplemental claims. An outright dismissal of the supplemental 
claims, especially after trial or on appeal, does not promote "the val-
ues of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity"188 any bet-
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
15, § 12. 
182. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
183. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.3. 
184. Hearings, supra note 75, at 96, 147, 156, 735. 
185. Id. at 96. 
186. Id. at 147, 156, 735. 
187. Id. at 98. See also H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11. 
188. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). 
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ter than a certification procedure. Nonetheless the Subcommittee 
deleted subsection (f) from the final version of the House Bill 5381. 
4. Supersession and Removal 
House Bill 5381, as introduced, contained a provision that would 
have prohibited the federal courts from developing "common law" 
rules· of supplemental jurisdiction. 189 On several occasions, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the doctrines of pendent and 
ancillary jurisdiction rest on judicial lawmaking. "[P]endent jurisdic-
tion is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived 
from the general Article III language conferring power to hear all 
'cases' arising under federal law or between diverse parties."I90 Simi-
larly, the Court has noted: "In the courts of the United States this 
ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised, though it is not authorized by 
any statute."191 Commentators have noted the inconsistency between 
this judicially-created law of supplemental jurisdiction and the tradi-
tional view that Congress authorizes and controls the jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courtS. 192 
Subsection (h) of the proposed section 1367 of House Bill 5381 
sought to preclude the courts from exercising supplemental jurisdic-
tion unless Congress expressly authorized it. 193 Subsection (h) read: 
"[Section 1367] supersedes any other provision of law except to the 
extent that a Federal statute expressly provides otherwise."194 When 
coupled with the suggested repeal of sections 1338(b)19S and 1441(c)196 
of title 28,197 the new section 1367 would have provided the exclusive 
authority upon which to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Judge 
Weis' substitute, offered to the subcommittee at the September 6 hear-
189. See generally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 42. 
190. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984). In 
another part of the majority opinion, Justice Powell made the point that "pendent jurisdic-
tion is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Article III." Id. at 117. 
191. Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562, 569 (1909). 
192. See supra note IS. 
193. The definitions of "Federal claim" and "non-Federal claim" in subsection (g) of 
the proposed section 1367 in H.R. 5381 reinforced the point that jurisdiction in the federal 
courts must have a "statutory basis." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. 
194. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. 
195. See supra note 5 for text. 
196. See supra note 6 for text. 
197. The original Wolf-Egnal proposal recommended the repeal of these sections. 
Hearings, supra note 75, at 700. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended the 
repeal of § 144I(c) if Congress retained the general diversity jurisdictional statute, but was 
silent on the question of repealing § 1338(b). STUDY CoMMIlTEE REPORT, supra note 3, 
pt. II, at 94-95. 
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ing, retained subsection (h) as subsection (f).198 Neither Judge Weis 
nor Judge Tacha said anything about subsection (h) at the hearing. 
However, the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler draft of September 11, 1990, 
omitted subsection (h) of the original bill (subsection (f) of the Weis 
substitute) for reasons that are not in the public record. 199 The final 
subcommittee version similarly omitted subsection (h), making no 
other reference to the concept of supersession.2°O 
Section 1367(a) begins with the words: "Except as provided in 
subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal 
statute .... "201 In correspondence between Professor Rowe and 
Judge Weis,202 Professor Rowe suggested omitting subsection (h) and 
replacing it with the qualifying language quoted in the previous sen-
tence that now appears at the beginning of subsection (a). For super-
session purposes, however, there is a significant difference between the 
two formulations. Under subsection (h) in the proposed section 1367 
contained in House Bill 5381, as introduced, the courts would be fore-
closed from developing any common law rules of supplemental juris-
diction outside of section 1367. 
In contrast, under subsection (a) of section 1367, as enacted, the 
federal courts retain that common law authority. 203 The predicate 
clause in subsection (a) simply recognizes the power of Congress ex-
pressly to limit the exercise by the courts of supplemental jurisdiction. 
Although subsection (a) extends the reach of this jurisdiction to the 
limits of Article III, the dependent clause that introduces the subsec-
198. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. 
199. Id at 722. See also Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme 
Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDlCATURE 213 (1991). 
200. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12. In amending the Rules Enabling 
Act in 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, §§ 401(a), 407, 102 Stat. 4648, 4652 (1988), the House and 
the Senate also confronted the issue of supersession in a related context: whether rules of 
practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court should supersede acts of Con· 
gress. Although Representative Kastenmeier led the fight to remove the supersession 
clause from existing law, see David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2072 (West Supp. 1991), Congress retained the clause in the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) 
(1988), which reads in part: "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further 
force or effect after such rules have taken effect." Id. In contrast, § 17 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 had a contrary provision: "[T]he said courts of the United States shall have power 
... to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said 
courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." 1 Stat. 73, 
83 (1789). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1035-39 (1982). 
201. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
202. Letter from Thomas D. Rowe, Professor, Duke University School of Law, to 
Judge Weis, Chairman, Federal Courts Study Committee, (Aug. 31, 1990) (on file with the 
author). 
203. See Appendix A for text of § 1367. 
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tion refers to subsections (b) and (c) which are limitations on the gen-
eral authority. This emphasizes the focus of the predicate clause as 
the power of Congress to negate the exercise of supplemental jurisdic-
. tion. In sharp contrast, under subsection (h) of the original version of 
House Bill 5381, the federal courts could not extend supplemental 
jurisdiction beyond the statute without affirmative action by Congress. 
The difference between the two approaches is critical. It goes to 
the heart of competing jurisprudential theories of the relationship be-
tween Congress and the federal courts. It may be illustrated by refer-
ence to the case law 9£ supplemental jurisdiction that emerged in the 
Aldinger-Kroger-Finley period. After Aldinger and Kroger, the courts 
assumed they could exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of 
Article III, as Gibbs had held, unless a congressional statute negated 
such exercise. That is, they could presume the existence of a 'broad 
scope of supplemental jurisdiction unless Congress otherwise expressly 
restricted it. After Finley, at least some courts took the opposite view: 
a presumption against supplemental jurisdiction (at least in pendent 
party cases) unless Congress expressly authorized it. Subsection (h) 
would have adopted the Finley approach, building on the traditional 
theory that Congress, not the judges, decides the scope of federal court 
jurisdiction. In contrast, section 1367(a), as enacted, adopted the 
Aldinger-Kroger approach: the courts may exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction to the limits of Article III except "as expressly provided 
otherwise by Federal statute."204 
In light of the deleted subsection (h), together with the deletion of 
subsection (g),205 the federal courts may continue to develop a federal 
common law of supplemental jurisdiction in areas where section 1367 
is either silent or ambiguous.206 For example, section 1367 does not 
by its terms apply to cases removed from the state courts into the fed-
eral courts pursuant to Chapter 89 ofthe Judicial Code.207 Many such 
removal cases involve issues of supplemental jurisdiction because of 
204. 28 V.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). See generally Mouchawar, supra 
note 35, at 1657-58. 
205. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31 (text of subsections (h) and (g) in House Bill 
5381); H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12 (text of final version of the bill). 
206. To the extent Congress has delegated authority to the federal courts under sub· 
section (a) of § 1367 to determine the scope of an Article III "case," one might more 
accurately refer to that development as "constitutional common law." See generally Henry 
P. Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); but see 
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978) (criticizing and critiquing Monaghan's approach). See gener-
ally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 42. Whatever label one attaches, the idea is that Con-
gress retains the power to change judicially developed doctrine under § 1367(a). 
207. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988). 
1992] CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 35 
the multi-claim or multi-party (or both) nature of the original suit filed 
in the state court. In some respects the issues are compounded be-
cause the plaintiff may have chosen the state court, recognizing the 
subject-matter jurisdictional difficulties that arise in federal court. The 
removal provisions, in giving the defendant the choice of forum, create 
additional problems of supplemental jurisdiction. 
The supplemental jurisdictional provisions in House Bill 5381, as 
introduced, clearly applied to cases removed from the state courts to 
the federal courts, as well as to actions commenced originally in the 
district courtS.20S The Weis substitute and the Rowe-Burbank-Men-
gler proposal omitted all references to removal cases in their revisions 
of the supplemental jurisdiction proposal. The public record does not 
disclose the reasons for this omission. This gap is compounded by the 
amendments to section 1441(c), which limit the reach of that subsec-
tion to civil actions arising under section 1331, the general federal 
question jurisdictional statute.209 A few years ago, the Supreme Court 
applied Gibbs-type standards to supplemental claims in a case re-
moved from state to federal court.210 The legislative history of section 
1367 is enigmatic as to the standards the courts should apply in re-
moval cases. If the analysis above is correct, under the new section 
1367, the federal courts retain a "common law" jurisdiction to fill 
gaps. Presumably the courts will fill this particular lacuna by judi-
cially-created common law of supplemental jurisdiction for removed 
cases, analogizing to the principles and rules in section 1367. 
The uncertainty surrounding the exercise of supplemental juris-
diction in removal cases is compounded further because the Federal 
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 also amended 
208. Hearings, supra note 75, at 28-32 (subsection (a)(I), the general provision, in-
cluded "an action removed from a State court"; subsection (a)(2) restricted supplemental 
jurisdiction in certain diversity cases "unless the action was removed from a State court"; 
and subsection (c) referred to "dismissal or remand"). 
209. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 5, 22-23. The host of uncertainties engen-
dered by the failure to conform amended § 1441 to the new § 1367 includes the provision 
authorizing remand only where "State law predominates." 28 U.S.c.A. § 1441(c) (West 
Supp. 1991). In his letter to Judge Weis of August 21, 1990, Professor Kramer noted that 
this limitation created an unexplained gap with the proposed § 1367(c), which identified 
the grounds for discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims in civil actions filed origi-
nally in the district courts. Hearings, supra note 75, at 713. Judge Weis made no reference 
to Professor Kramer's point in his testimony on September 6, 1990. Furthermore, both the 
Wolf-Egnal proposal, Hearings, supra note 75, at 700, and the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee, STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 94-95, recommended outright 
repeal of § 1441(c). The Study Committee recommended repeal "only if Congress retains 
the general diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 95. Congress did retain diversity jurisdiction, 
although it imposed limitations regarding supplemental claims. 
210. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
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section 1441(c).211 Under former section 1441(c), the district court on 
removal had jurisdiction over "the entire case,"212 including "separate 
and independent ... otherwise non-removable claims."213 Under the 
1990 amendments,214 removal of "separate and independent" claims 
that would otherwise be "non-removable" is restricted to actions aris-
ing under section 1331 of title 28,215 the general federal question juris-
dictional statute. Although the Federal Courts Study Committee 
recommended that section 1441(c) be repealed outright,216 the 1990 
Act simply restricted its applicability to actions arising under section 
1331. 
The legislative history is silent on the relationship between the 
amended section 1441(c) (and removal in general) and section 1367. 
The House Report, however, addresses the matter indirectly: 
In many cases the federal and state claims will be related in such a 
way as to establish pendant [sic] jurisdiction over the state claim. 
Removal of such cases is possible under section 1441 (a). The 
amended provision would establish a basis for removal that would 
avoid the need to decide whether there is pendant [sic] 
jurisdiction.217 
211. After the recent amendments, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) reads: "Whenever a separate 
and independent claim or cause ofaction, [within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 
of this title,] is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, 
the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, 
in its discretion, may remand all matters [in which state law predominates]." 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1441(c) (West Supp. 1991). Section 312 of the Federal Courts Study Implementation Act 
of 1990 amended this section to limit its reach to cases within the jurisdiction of the general 
federal jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1991). See 104 Stat. 5089, 
5114 (1990). Prior to the recent amendments, § 1441(c) read: "Whenever a separate and 
independent claim or cause of action, [which would be removable if sued upon alone,] is 
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case 
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, 
may remand all matters [not otherwise within its original jurisdiction]." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(c) (1988). The 1990 statute added the bracketed material to the amended § 1441(c) 
and omitted the bracketed materials from the former section. Prior to the recent amend-
ments to § 144 1 (c), the Supreme Court had interpreted that subsection not to apply to 
supplemental claims in cases removed from state courts to federal courts. Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988). 
213. Id. 
214. Section 312 of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 
1990, Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089,5114 (1990). 
215. Id. 
216. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 94-95. The original Wolf-
Egnal proposal to Representative Kastenmeier also recommended the repeal of § 1441(c) 
as well as § 1338(b) of title 28. Hearings, supra note 75, at 700. 
217. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 23. The use of the phrase "pendant [sic] 
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This legislative history suggests that the old law of pendent jurisdic-
tion (and inferentially the new law of supplemental jurisdiction) is 
"possibly" incorporated into subsection (a) of section 1441 presum-
ably by reason of prior case law.218 
But the legislative history also states that prior law is not needed 
because the amended section 1441(c) will take care of all such ques-
tions. If pendent (and thus supplemental) claims are not "separate 
and independent," however, as Cohil/ 219 held, then the amended sec-
tion 1441(c) cannot be a substitute for supplemental jurisdiction unless 
the courts, in light of this legislative history, reinterpret the phrase 
"separate and independent" to include all supplemental claims.220 
The amended section 1441(c) also raises the question whether, in 
light of prior interpretation of "separate and independent," it has any 
utility regarding supplemental claims. At least one commentator has 
declared the amended section effectively useless.221 The argument is 
that, since subsection (a) of section 1367 reaches to the limits of Arti-
cle III, section 1441(c), ifit seeks to reach further, "would pose a con-
stitutional issue."222 This may be true if one accepts the definition of 
"one constitutional 'case' " as Gibbs defined it (whether one adopts a 
two-pronged or three-pronged test). If, however, Congress has the 
power to define "one constitutional 'case or controversy' " differently 
(and more broadly) from Gibbs, then section 1441(c) might very well 
be constitutional. 
The argument is that a "case" or "controversy" could include, for 
example, all claims a plaintiff has against a defendant even if they arise 
jurisdiction" is odd since the same act establishes supplemental jurisdiction in new section 
1367, and thus abolishes the older tenninology of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. 
218. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
219. Id. 
220. Logically, this interpretation would be a very sensible one were it not for the 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 
(1988); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). In these cases, the Court 
held that, if the plaintiff's claims are a result of "a single wrong," they are not "separate 
and independent" even if the claims are rooted separately in state and federal law. Cohill, 
484 U.S. at 350-51; Finn, 341 U.S. at 14. The reader should contrast this interpretation 
with the Court's very different approach in applying the "independent and adequate" state 
grounds doctrine to preclude Supreme Court review of state court judgments. In such 
instances, the Court essentially considers state and federal grounds for decision as "sepa-
rate and independent" for purposes of precluding review, even though these grounds are 
rooted in a single wrong. See generally CHEMER1NSKY, supra note IS, § lO.5. Perhaps 
Congress has the power to force a judicial reinterpretation of statutory language even 
though the same words remain in the statute. 
221. David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New 
(Dec. 1. 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 78-79 (1991) (section 1441(c) 
"may have to grope for some gainful employment"). 
222. Id. at 79. 
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out of totally separate transactions or occurrences, or do not have a 
common nucleus of operative fact. The legislative history supports 
this interpretation: "The joinder rules of many states permit a plaintiff 
to join completely unrelated claims in a single action. The plaintiff 
could easily bring a single action on a federal claim and a completely 
unrelated state claim."223 In short, a Rule 18(a)-type joinder is consti-
tutionally permissible if Congress authorizes it, even if each claim does 
not have an independent basis of jurisdiction. One might ask why 
Congress would have a broader rule of supplemental jurisdiction on 
removal than in original actions filed in the district court. The answer 
may be to prevent plaintiffs from adding unrelated, non-removable 
claims to their state court suits to deprive the defendant of his or her 
right to litigate the federal questions in a federal forum. 224 
D. Diversity Exception 
Subsection (b) of section 1367 carves out an exception for certain 
supplemental claims asserted in civil actions brought solely under sec-
tion 1332 of title 28. The thrust of subsection (b) is to preclude volun-
tary or involuntary plaintiffs or persons see~ng to become plaintiffs 
(for example, intervenors) from asserting any supplemental claim that 
would be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332."225 This potentially sweeping limitation to the exercise of sup-
plemental jurisdiction has already generated controversy. Professor 
Freer has written that the new statute "embodies a disquieting bias 
against diversity of citizenship jurisdiction that maims packaging [of 
jurisdiction-conferring and supplemental claims] in diversity cases."226 
Section 1367(b), as enacted, differs significantly from the compa-
rable provisions in House Bill 5381, as introduced. First, under the 
223. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 23. 
224. See supra note 220. 
225. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
226. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity. supra note 9, at 446. 
For a spirited defense of the statute, see Thomas D. Rowe et aI., Compounding or Creating 
Confusion about Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 
(1991). For an equally vigorous response to this response, see Thomas C. Arthur & Rich-
ard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Stat-
ute, 40 EMORY L.I. 963 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws]. 
Not to be outdone, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler further rejoined in Thomas D. 
Rowe et aI., A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991). Professors 
Arthur and Freer offered the "final" non-final words in Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. 
Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its 
Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991). Although supportive of the new statute, one commenta-
tor argues that subsection (b) is susceptible of three distinct and varying interpretations. 
Mouchawar, supra note 35, at 1659-62. 
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earlier version of House Bill 5381, the restriction applied only to ac-
tions based "solely on diversity of citizenship under section 1332."221 
According to the terms of section 1367(a), the restrictions on the as-
sertion of supplemental claims apply to all actions "founded solely on 
section 1332,"228 including alienage and foreign state as plaintiff cases. 
Although the legislative history discloses an intent to limit the asser-
tion of supplemental claims only in diversity cases,229 the subsection 
applies, even if "through inadvertence, "230 to all actions brought pur-
suant to section 1332, not just diversity cases.231 
Second, the intent of the earlier provision was "to retain the es-
sence of the complete diversity requirement that derives from Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss. "232 Thus, the earlier version would have prohibited 
the original plaintiff or plaintiffs from joining non-diverse defendants 
in the original action filed in the federal court.233 However, if an origi-
nal defendant impleaded a non-diverse defendant, then the original 
plaintiff or plaintiffs could have asserted a supplemental claim against 
the impleaded (non-diverse) defendant. This approach would also 
have prevailed regarding other joined parties or intervenors. In short, 
as introduced, the provision would have overruled the holding, but not 
the result, in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.234 
Section 1367(b)implements the complete diversity requirement in 
a much wider variety of circumstances than House Bill 5381, as intro-
duced. Indeed, section 1367 imposes greater restrictions than are jus-
tified by "pre-Finley practice. "235 The legislative history refers to this 
expansion as "one small change."236 It codifies the ruling in Kroger by 
227. Hearings, supra note 75, at 29. 
228. 28 U.S.C,A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
229. H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29. 
230. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9, at 475. 
231. See generally id. at 474-75. 
232. Hearings, supra note 75, at 692. 
233. The restrictions in draft § 1367(a)(2) contained in § 120 of H.R. 5381, as intro-
duced, applied only to "the original plaintiff," a phrase which the Supreme Court later 
employed to describe the limits of ancillary jurisdiction in a diversity action. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 858, 860 (1991) (per curiam). 
23:4. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Under the proposed § 1367 in H.R. 5381, the district 
court would have retained the discretionary power to dismiss the supplemental claim if it 
"substantially predominates" over the jurisdiction-conferring claim. Hearings, supra note 
75, at 30. In Kroger, the supplemental claim was the only claim remaining in the case after 
the judge, at the outset of the litigation, dismissed the jurisdiction-conferring claim against 
the original diverse defendant. Thus, under the proposed statute, the judge would have 
dismissed the supplemental claim as well. 
235. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29. See generally Freer, Compounding 
Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9; Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt 
Straws, supra note 226. 
236. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29. Professor Freer diSagrees as to the size 
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prohibiting plaintiffs from asserting a supplemental claim against im-
pleaded, non-diverse defendants. In addition, the original plaintiff or 
person(s) later joined or joining as plaintiffs are forbidden to assert 
supplemental claims (probably including counterclaims) against any 
non-diverse party. But the complete diversity requirement is aban-
doned in other instances. For example, as under prior practice, the 
restrictions in subsection (b) by their terms do not apply to supple-
mental claims asserted by defendants against non-diverse parties, 
plaintiff or defendant. Thus, an impleaded third party defendant may 
assert a supplemental claim against the plaintiff, but the plaintiff can-
not assert a supplemental claim against that defendant.237 
Perhaps also "through inadvertence," section 1367(b), as enacted, 
appears to permit two plaintiffs in a diversity action to sue a defendant 
who is not diverse from one of the plaintiffs so long as the other plain-
tiff is diverse from the defendant.238 In addition a non-diverse plaintiff 
who is later joined may also assert such a claim. Three of the consul-
tants to the House Subcommittee on the new statute agree that the 
statute has these 100pholes.239 The gaps exist because section 1367(b) 
restricts the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases only 
"over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 
19,20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by 
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, 
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24. "240 The restriction 
does not on its face reach the plaintiff initially or later joined under 
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Thus, the statute could be interpreted to overturn the complete 
diversity rule of Strawbridge in the simplest of cases to which it has 
always applied. Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler offer an in-
terpretation that would close this "potentially gaping hole in the com-
plete diversity requirement-either by regarding it as an unacceptable 
circumvention of original diversity jurisdiction requirements, or by 
reference to the intent not to abandon the complete diversity rule that 
is clearly expressed in the legislative history of section 1367."241 This 
approach raises again the jurisprudential points noted earlier: whether 
of the change effected by subsection (b). Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering 
Diversity, supra note 9, at 475-86. See also Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws, 
supra note 226. 
237. See generally Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra 
note 9, at 478-82. 
238. See generally Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws, supra note 226. 
239. Rowe et aI., supra note 226, at 961 n.91. 
240. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
241. Rowe et aI., supra note 226, at 961 n.91. 
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the courts may prefer the "spirit" of a statute over its express lan-
guage, and whether the courts will continue to develop a common law 
of supplemental jurisdiction. Jurisprudence aside, at least some judges 
appear to have adopted the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler interpretive 
approach.242 
Finally, since the new statute requires compliance with all of "the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332,"243 the plaintiffs must also 
satisfy the amount in controversy restriction in section 1332.244 This 
limitation arguably overrules Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,245 
which required only the named plaintiffs in a class action suit to satisfy 
the complete diversity requirement. The legislative history, however, 
states: "The section is not intended to affect the jurisdictional require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those re-
quirements were interpreted prior to Finley."246 This conflict between 
the words of the statute and the legislative history raises the jurispru-
dential point as to which should prevail. On occasion, the Supreme 
Court has given primacy to the purpose of a statute or the intention of 
the legislature over its express language. In Church o/the Holy Trinity 
v. United States,247 for example, the Court noted the "familiar rule, 
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its 
makers."248 
Third, the original provision in House Bill 5381 would have ap-
plied the complete diversity restriction on supplemental claims in di-
versity cases only if the plaintiff originally filed the action in the 
federal district court. If the defendant removed the case from the state 
court, then the restriction would not apply and the normal rule of 
supplemental jurisdiction, as set out in subsection (a), would apply.249 
Neither the enacted section 1367 nor the legislative history makes ref-
242. See Fink v. Heath, No. 91-C2982, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9182 (N.D. Ill. July 
2, 1991); c/. Cheramie v. Texaco, Inc., No. 91-3114, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (E.D. 
La. Oct. 30, 1991). 
243. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
244. This amount is now $50,000. 
245. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
246. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29 (footnote omitted). In the omitted 
footnote, the Report expressly refers to the Cauble case as well as Zahn v. International 
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which required each member of the plaintiff class to satisfy 
the amount in controversy requirement. 
247. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
248. Id. at 459. See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); United Steelworkers 
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979). 
249. See Appendix A for text of § 1367. 
42 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
erence to removed cases. As noted earlier,250 the amendments to sec-
tion 1441(c) of title 28 are enigmatic at best on the question of the 
relationship between the standards for the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction in removal cases and the standards in cases filed originally 
in the district court to which section 1367 applies. 
Fourth, in comparing House Bill 5381 as introduced and section 
1367(b) as enacted, the question arises as to which, if either, more 
faithfully adheres to the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study 
Committee. The House Report refers to the Study Committee recom-
mendation to codify supplemental jurisdiction. Apart from an ambig-
uous reference to "federal question jurisdiction,"25I the Study 
Committee report is silent on the question whether diversity cases 
should be treated differently from federal question cases. In his pre-
pared congressional statement, Judge Weis, the chair of the Study 
Committee stated: "I must confess that the Study Committee Report 
on [supplemental] jurisdiction is not as precise as it might have been, 
but I do recall discussion during one of our meetings that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction should be limited to federal question cases. "252 
Similarly, the Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of 
the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation 
to the States also recommended that supplemental jurisdiction in di-
versity cases be limited.253 This report appears in Part III of the Study 
Committee Report.254 The Study Committee made it clear, however, 
that the materials in Part III of its report were not considered authori-
tative. The introduction to Part III states: "In no event should the 
enclosed materials be construed as having been adopted by the Com-
mittee."25s In addition, the report of the subcommittee offers this dis-
claimer: "Not every member of the subcommittee has agreed to all of 
the proposals or analysis contained in this Report, and the absence of 
dissent should not be understood to signify approval."2S6 Further-
more, reliance on Judge Weis' recollection of subcommittee or com-
mittee discussions would also be inappropriate if they did not find 
250. See supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text. 
251. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47. In Judge Weis' pre-
pared statement to the subcommittee, he inexplicably omits the reference to "federal ques-
tion jurisdiction" in quoting from the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee. 
Hearings, supra note 75, at 92-93. 
252. Hearings, supra note 75, at 93. 
253. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. II, at 563-68. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. pi. III, vol. I, at first page (unnumbered). 
256. Id. at first page (unnumbered) of subcommittee report. 
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expression in the text or recommendations of the Study Committee 
Report. 
Perhaps one could justify the limitations on supplemental juris-
diction in certain diversity cases by reference to prior case law257 or to 
the recommendation of the Study Committee to abolish diversity juris-
diction generally with three limited exceptions.258 These approaches 
have several problems. First, the Study Committee recommendation 
to Congress to authorize supplemental jurisdiction is at best ambigu-
ous both regarding prior case law and the restrictions in diversity 
cases. 
Second, the Study Committee, as an alternative proposal, recom-
mended restricting diversity jurisdiction if Congress opted not to abol-
ish it altogether. This "backup proposal" contained four distinct 
elements which collectively would have further restricted the exercise 
of diversity jurisdiction without abolishing it.259 None of these ele-
ments included any reference to supplemental jurisdiction. If the 
Study Committee intended to restrict the use of supplemental jurisdic-
tion in diversity cases, one would have expected to find that recom-
mendation either in this back-up proposal, or in the recommendation 
on supplemental jurisdiction itself. 
Third, reliance on the Study Committee recommendation to abol-
ish diversity as the source for restricting the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction in diversity cases confronts another difficulty. As noted 
earlier,260 the four members of Congress26 \ who served on the Study 
Committee directed their staffs, in the spring of 1990, to draft a bill 
that included only the "noncontroversial"262 recommendations of the 
Study Committee. They defined "noncontroversial" to include those 
recommendations to which none of the four members of Congress had 
objected and which would not generate significant opposition.263 
While these four members agreed with the recommendation to author-
ize supplemental jurisdiction expressly by statute,264 only three of 
257. See, e.g., iii. at 563-67. 
258. Id. pt. II, at 38- 43. 
259. Id. pt. II, at 42. 
260. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
261. The four members were Representatives Robert Kastenmeier and Carlos Moor-
head, and Senators Howell Heflin and Charles Grassley. 
262. Conversation with Charles G. G.eyh. See also Hearings.supra note 75, at 103. 
263. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. On the floor of the Senate, Senator 
Grassley described his understanding of "noncontroversial" in a slightly different way. He 
stated that the proposals in the pending legislation embodied "only those consensus items 
that enjoyed unanimous support among study committee members." 136 CONGo REC. 
S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (emphasis added). 
264. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47-48. 
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them agreed to abolish diversity jurisdiction.265 Senator Grassley op-
posed "the complete abolition of diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction. "266 
In addition, the House of Representatives had on recent occasions 
sought to abolish diversity jurisdiction completely. In both instances, 
the bill passed the House only to flounder in the Senate. Opposition 
from the trial lawyers and other segments of the bar caused the defeat 
of the bill.267 Although the American Bar Association originally sup-
ported the move to abolish diversity, it later changed its mind under 
pressure from the bar.268 A provision to restrict severely the utiliza-
tion of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions would have 
aroused opposition had the matter been widely known. On the other 
hand, a bill that treated diversity and federal question actions equally 
with regard to supplemental claims might have provoked vigorous op-
position from the federal bench. 
Of course, one could read the recommendations of the Study 
Committee as favoring supplemental jurisdiction equally in federal 
question and diversity cases. If so, then the original proposal in House 
Bill 5381, which contained a modest restriction on supplemental juris-
diction in diversity cases, would also be inconsistent with the Study 
Committee Report. Thus, we may be left with an equally authorita-
tive or nonauthoritative reading of the tea leaves left behind by the 
Study Committee. In this context, then, Judge Weis' recollection of 
discussions, even if they never found their way into the Study Com-
mittee Report, helps to clarify to some degree the intent of at least 
some members of the Study Committee on the critical question of the 
availability of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. 
III. POST-STATUTE DECISIONAL LAW 
Although section 1367 is barely one year old, it has provided the 
basis for supplemental jurisdiction in numerous cases. Its regular use 
demonstrates the need for the statute and the widespread invocation of 
265. The three were Representatives Kastenmeier and Moorhead, and Senator 
Heflin. 
266. STUDY COMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 42. When the bill contain-
ing § 1367 came to the floor of the Senate, Senator Grass1ey supported it and included in 
the Congressional Record a section-by-section analysis of the supplemental jurisdiction 
proposal, which tracked nearly verbatim the House Judiciary Committee Report. 136 
CONGo REC. S17580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
267. Letter from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor, Western New England College School 
of Law, to Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law (Aug. 31, 
1990). Hearings, supra note 75, at 719. 
268. Id. 
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supplemental jurisdiction in the federal courts. Most of the decisions 
are still unreported, although they may be found in electronic 
databases. Based on this limited sample, one can draw few conclu-
sions about the success or failure of the statute to perform its stated 
goals. However, a preliminary survey of the decided cases discloses 
some predictable problems and results, and a few surprises. 
First, although section 1367 became effective on December 1, 
1990, courts have disagreed as to whether this section is relevant to 
actions commenced prior to its effective date.269 Section 310(c) of this 
Act made section 1367 applicable only "to civil actions commenced on 
or after the date of enactment of this Act."27o Consequently, a 
number of cases have rejected the application of section 1367 because 
the action was commenced before December 1, 1990.271 However, 
some of these courts have nonetheless utilized the statute to confirm 
(and perhaps to influence) their reading of the law prior to the enact-
ment of the statute.272 For example, Judge Posner, a member of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, appeared to take this approach in a 
recent court of appeals decision. 273 In addition, at least one court 
seems to have utilized section 1367 to determine, rather than confirm, 
the pre-statute practice or rule of supplemental jurisdiction.274 
Furthermore, other issues have arisen regarding the effective date 
of the statute. At least one court has held that the relevant date is not 
the commencement of the original action, but rather the date the party 
asserting the supplemental claim filed the relevant pleading.275 Simi-
larly in removal cases, the relevant date appears to be the date of re-
269. President Bush approved the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 on December 
I, 1990. 
270. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 31O(c), 104 Stat. 
5089, 5114 (1990). 
271. E.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991); Salazar v. City of 
Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991); Scott v. Long Island Say. Bank, FSB, 937 F.2d 738 
(2d Cir. 1991); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990). 
272. E.g., Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, No. 91-864, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 539 (Jan. 21, 1992); Castellano v. Board of 
Trustees, 937 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 378 (1991); Scott v. Long Island 
Say. Bank, FSB, 937 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1991); Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60 
(2d Cir. 1991); Webb v. Just In Time, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Perkins v. 
City of Philadelphia, 766 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776 
F. Supp. 61 (D.P.R. 1991). 
273. Winstead v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1991). 
274. Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991). 
275. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 769 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D. N.Y. 
1991). The plaintiffs commenced the original action before December I, 1990, while a 
defendant filed the third party complaint that asserted the supplemental claim after that 
date. 
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moval rather than the date the case began in the state court.276 
Second, the district judges have typically relied on section 1367, 
with little or no analysis, to determine whether they have the power to 
entertain the particular supplemental claims asserted in the action 
before them.277 In pre-statute days, the courts would apply the two-
prong or three-prong test of Gibbs to make that determination.278 The 
post-statute decisions tend to refer simply to section 1367 without 
more. Thus, the decisions do not seem to struggle at all with the ques-
tion whether the claims "form part of the same case or controversy 
under Article III of the United States Constitution."279 
In contrast, some of the recent cases have discussed, however 
briefly, the statutory prerequisites for exercising supplemental jurisdic-
tion. The decisions vary as they did prior to the statute. Some courts 
apply a three-factor Gibbs test ("substantiality," "common nucleus," 
and "expected to try") to determine whether they have the power 
under section 1367(a) to entertain supplemental claims.280 Other 
judges apply a two-factor test ("common nucleus" and "expected to 
try").281 In one case, the court referred to these two Gibbs factors in 
interpreting section 1367, but applied only the common nucleus test to 
determine whether supplemental jurisdiction in fact existed.282 Fi-
nally, in another case, the court made reference only to the "common 
nucleus" factor to determine whether it had the power to entertain the 
supplemental claims.283 
276. Ryan v. Cosentino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. III. 1991); Cedillo v. Valcar Enter. 
& Darling Del. Co., 773 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Tex. 1991); cf. Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic 
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
277. E.g., SaIyard v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, No. 91·1812, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15900 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991); Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., Inc., No. 91-2057, 
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14718 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1991); Richardson v. Kraft-Holleb Food 
Serv., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. III. 1991); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. 
Prods. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Travis v. Mattern, No. 90-7929, 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11489 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1991); American Millworks v. Mellon Bank Corp., 
No. 88-6153, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8393 (E.D. La. June 13, 1991); Martinez v. Shinn, 
No. C89-813-JBH, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6985 (E.D. Wash. May 20, 1991). 
278. See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text. 
279. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
280. E.g., Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Serv., 762 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. 
Pa. 1991). See supra note 36. 
281. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., No. C91-1708 RFP (ENE), 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15887 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1991); Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban 
Ambulatory Surgical Ctc., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. III. 1991); Cedillo v. Valcar Enter. 
& Darling Del. Co., 773 F. Supp. '932 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 90-
8126, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991). 
282. See Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991). 
283. Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991); accord Ryan v. Cosen-
tino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. III. 1991). 
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Third, some cases have found it unnecessary to invoke section 
1367 because existing law already authorizes supplemental jurisdic-
tion. In Friedman v. Stacey Data Processing Services, Inc.,284 for ex-
ample, the complaint asserted a copyright claim together with a state 
law claim of unfair competition. Relying on section 1338(b),28S one of 
the few provisions in the United States Code that expressly authorized 
supplemental jurisdiction prior to section 1367, the court held that it 
did not have to analyze the new statute because the supplemental 
claim fit within section 1338(b).286 Similarly, in a civil action based on 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,287 the court also found that 
statute sufficiently broad to cover the supplemental claims, although it 
also relied alternatively on section 1367.288 
Fourth, in the few removal cases that have raised supplemental 
jurisdiction issues since the enaCtment of section 1367, the courts have 
apparently followed the principles of section 1367,289 although the 
statute and legislative history are unclear as to their applicability.290 
In discussing the use of supplemental jurisdiction in removal cases, 
this Article earlier noted difficulties with the new statute: the prob-
lematic reliance upon section 1441(c), as amended, as the source of 
authority for supplemental jurisdiction; and the silence of the statute 
and legislative history as to the standards to apply in removal cases. 
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp.291 underscores these difficulties. 
In Doe, the district court rejected the application of section 
1441(c) to supplemental claims asserted in removal cases, even though 
the legislative history stated that it would apply.292 It did, however, 
284. No. 89-C4444, 1991 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 9243 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1991). 
285. 28 U.S.c. § 1338(b) (1988). 
286. In another copyright case, the court relied on § 1367 to reach supplemental 
claims based on state contract law. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., No. C91-1708 RFP 
(ENE), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15887 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1991). The judge did not address 
the question whether § 1338(b) should be interpreted to bar all supplemental claims not 
within that subsection. 
287. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). 
288. Colgan v. Port Auth., No. 91-CVI136, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12610 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991). In suits involving foreign sovereigns as plaintiffs, reliance on 
§ 1367 could be dangerous since subsection (b) might be read to restrict supplemental juris-
diction in cases resting solely on § 1332 (a)( 4). 
289. E.g., Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 186 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Alex-
ander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991). 
290. See supra notes 189-220 and accompanying text. 
291. 763 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
292. Id. at 1042-43; accord Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 90-8126, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991). 
In Doe, the court did not address the point that Congress could command the courts 
to reinterpret the "separate and independent" language of section 1441(c) to cover supple-
mental claims. In Aleltander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 
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rely on prior precedents and section 1367 as the sources of law for 
asserting supplemental claims in removal cases.293 Although amended 
section 1441(c) appears to authorize a remand only of "all matters in 
which state law predominates,"294 one court has interpreted the sub-
section to permit remand of the entire case, including the federal ques-
tions,295 and another to permit remand if the federal claim is 
dismissed.296 
Fifth, one surprising impact has been the application of section 
1367 to suits against states that assert Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.297 Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,298 
federal court plaintiffs may not, because of the Eleventh Amendment, 
assert supplemental claims based on state law against a state defendant 
or its agencies or officials. The original Wolf-Egnal proposal,299 sub-
mitted to Representative Kastenmeier, contained a provision that 
would have overruled Halderman. 3OO Because some of the consultants 
to Representative Kastenmeier's subcommittee raised constitutional 
objections to that proposal, he did not include the provision in House 
Bill 5381. The issue has arisen in a few cases under the new statute. 
One court has exercised supplemental jurisdiction against a state 
defendant because it read section 1367 as removing prior disabilities 
under Aldinger v. Howard. 30l In Rosen v. Chang,302 the court held 
that the plaintiff could assert a state claim against the State so long as 
it has waived its sovereign immunity. Prior case law permitted suits 
against state entities in federal trial courts, notwithstanding the Elev-
enth Amendment, if the State consents to suit in the federal court or if 
Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity. If neither of these con-
ditions obtains, however, section 1367 does not authorize supplemen-
1991), the court held that, although § 1441(c) is useless as a basis for supplementaljurisdic-
tion, it did find a use for it in that case. 
For a discussion of § 1441(c), as amended in 1990, see supra notes 209-20 and accom-
panying text. 
293. Doe, 763 F. Supp. at 1041; accord Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 90-8126, 1991 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991); Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, 766 F. 
Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
294. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (West Supp. 1991). 
295. Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991). 
296. Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
297. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note IS, ch. 7 (excellent discussion of the 
Eleventh Amendment). 
298. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
299. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686. 
300. Id. at 687 (draft § 1367(b)(iv». 
301. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See discussion supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
302. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991). 
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tal claims against a state entity or official. 303 
Sixth, a smattering of recent cases addresses a series of other 
questions under section 1367. This Article earlier raised the question 
whether the judges will state their reasons for dismissing supplemental 
claims under section 1367(c). Generally, the courts have stated the 
grounds, however briefly, upon which they have dismissed such 
claims.304 On occasion, however, a court has simply dismissed the 
supplemental claim under section 1367(c) without reference to any 
particular subparagraph. 305 Another issue raised earlier is the rela-
tionship between section 1367 and other provisions of federal law au-
thorizing supplemental jurisdiction.306 In two recent cases, this 
question arose under the Copyright Act307 and under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act. 308 In both instances, the courts held that these 
statutes authorized the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 309 In one 
case,310 the judge declined to address the application of section 1367, 
finding the other jurisdictional statute sufficient,311 while in the other 
case,312 the court relied alternatively on section 1367.313 
CONCLUSION 
The codification of supplemental jurisdiction was a necessary 
congressional act in view of recent Supreme Court decisions that seri-
ously diminished and threatened to undermine completely the doc-
trines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. "Section 1367 not only 
303. Ryan v. Cosentino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ill. 1991); cf. Blum v. Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 90-2428-R, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4612 (D. Kan. March 5, 1991) 
(diversity jurisdiction action). 
304. E.g., Imperiale v. Hahnernann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Leyh v. 
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resurrects pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it also makes great 
strides in resolving much of the confusion surrounding the doc-
trines."314 The enactment provided the statutory basis for the asser-
tion in federal court of claims that do not have an independent ground 
of jurisdiction. If Congress had not acted, the absence of a statutory 
basis for supplemental jurisdiction would have provided continued jus-
tification for further judicial erosion of the prior doctrines. 
But the good work accomplished by the act of Congress codifying 
supplemental jurisdiction may have been tainted by two key features 
of section 1367: the broad power delegated to federal judges to enter-
tain and dismiss supplemental claims, and the major exception pro-
vided in the statute for civil actions brought pursuant to section 1332 
(largely diversity and alienage cases). The expansion of this exception 
during the legislative process may have converted a "noncontrover-
sial" measure into a controversial one. 
For example, Professor Freer has sharply criticized the Congress 
for enacting the supplemental jurisdiction provision without adequate 
consideration, and without giving all concerned parties the opportu-
nity to participate in its drafting and enactment.3lS In addition, Con-
gress has in recent years refused to abolish diversity jurisdiction 
altogether. The exception for diversity cases in the new section 1367 
could be viewed as an end run around past congressional refusal to 
take the bigger step of repealing diversity jurisdiction. 
The statute might very well be praised as "a model of successful 
dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches."316 With the 
exception of a few provisions here and there around the United States 
Code, supplemental jurisdiction has largely been a product of judicial 
creativity and ingenuity. The time had arrived when Congress had to 
address the matter and place the doctrine on a firmer footing. If con-
gressional authorization of federal court jurisdiction is accepted as the 
controlling principle, then legislative action was absolutely required. 
Needless to say, Congress rarely "gets it right" the first time it ven-
tures forth into a relatively new field oflegislation. Thus, section 1367 
might need some fine-tuning as the courts, through interpretation and 
application, define its scope and impact. As Congress takes up the 
314. Mouchawar, supra note 35, at 1613. 
315. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9; Arthur 
& Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws, supra note 226. See also John B. Oakley, Recent Statu-
tory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements 
Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735,757-69 (1991). 
316. Thomas M. Mengler et aI., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Cod-
ify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 216 (1991). 
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more controversial recommendations in the report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee,317 it might wish to reevaluate aspects of sec-
tion 1367. 
317. See supra note 3. 
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the 
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include 
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district 
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) 
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 
19,20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by 
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, 
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be incon-
sistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental juris-
diction over a claim under subsection (a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or 
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling 
reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsec-
tion (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily 
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under 
subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a 
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a 
longer tolling period. 
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District 
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or 
possession of the United States. 
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ApPENDIX B: WOLF-EGNAL PROPOSAL 
§ 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
*[(a) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, including an action removed from a State court, any party 
may assert a non-federal claim against any person or other party if: 
(i) the federal claim in the original complaint is not insubstantial; and 
(ii) the original federal claim and the non-federal claim arise out of 
the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occur-
rences. If the original federal claim is founded solely on diversity of 
citizenship, the original plaintiff may assert a non-federal claim only 
against a party or person whom that plaintiff has not brought into the 
civil action, unless the action was removed from a State court.] 
*[(a) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, including an action removed from a State court, any party 
may assert a non-federal claim against any person or other party if: 
(i) the federal claim in the original complaint is not insubstantial; and 
(ii) the original federal claim and the non-federal claim are so related 
that they constitute one case or controversy within the meaning of 
Article III. If the original federal claim is founded solely on diversity 
of citizenship, the original plaintiff may assert a non-federal claim only 
against a party or person whom that plaintiff has not brought into the 
civil action, unless the action was removed from a State court.] 
(b) The district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
under subsection (a) even if: (i) the non-federal claim is asserted 
against a person who is not already a party to the civil action; (ii) the 
non-federal claim is the only claim asserted against a party or a person 
to be brought into the civil action; (iii) the party or person asserting 
the non-federal claim is an intervenor or an applicant for intervention; 
or (iv) the party or person against whom the non-federal claim is as-
serted is a State, an agency of a State, or State officials. 
(c) The district court shall, within 90 days of the commencement 
of the action or assertion of the non-federal claim (whichever is later), 
determine whether the non-federal claim should be dismissed. The 
court shall dismiss or remand the non-federal claim if it is outside the 
scope of subsection (a). The court may dismiss or remand the non-
federal claim if: (i) the federal claim is dismissed; or (ii) the non-fed-
eral claim substantially predominates over the federal claim; or 
(iii) the non-federal claim should be tried separately. Upon entry of an 
• Alternative formulations for subsection (a). 
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order dismissing the non-federal claim, the district court shall file with 
the order a written statement of reasons for the dismissal. 
(d) The period of limitations for any non-federal claim shall be 
tolled while the claim is pending in the district court and for a period 
of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) unless state law 
provides for a longer tolling period. 
(e) The district court may enter final judgment on the merits of 
the non-federal claim if it is not dismissed under subsection (c), even 
if, at the time of judgment, the federal claim has been dismissed. 
(f) The district court, in determining the nature and scope of any 
non-federal claim based on state law, shall freely utilize any certifica-
tion procedures available for the determination of state law. 
(g) As used in this section: 
(i) "federal claim" means any claim that has an indepen-
dent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district courts; 
(ii) "non-federal claim" means any claim that does not have 
an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the dis-
trict court; 
(iii) "State" includes the Territories, the District of Colum-
bia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
(iv) "case" or "controversy" includes all claims, whatever 
their legal sources, that: (A) arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; or (B) would 
ordinarily be tried together in one judicial proceeding. 
(h) This section supersedes any other provision of law unless 
Congress otherwise expressly provides by statute. 
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ApPENDIX C: H.R. 5381 SECTION 120 
SEC. 120. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION. 
(a) GRANT OF JURISDICTION.-Chapter 85 of title 28, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 
§ 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction 
(a) IN GENERAL.-(I) In any civil action of which the dis-
trict courts .have original jurisdiction, including an action re-
moved from a State court, any party or person may assert a non-
Federal claim against any person or other party if-
(A) the Federal claim in the original complaint is not 
insubstantial; and 
(B) the original Federal claim and the non-Federal 
claim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or se-
ries of transactions or occurrences. 
(2) If the original Federal claim in a civil action is founded 
solely on diversity of citizenship under section 1332, the original 
plaintiff may assert a non-Federal claim under paragraph (1) only 
against the original defendant or against a party or person who 
has been brought into the action by a party or person other than 
the plaintiff, unless the action was removed from a State court. 
(b) SITUATIONS WHERE JURISDICTION MAY BE EXER-
CISED.-Except as provided in subsection (a)(2), the district court 
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) even 
if- . 
(1) the non-Federal claim is asserted against a person 
who is not already a party to the civil action; 
(2) the non-Federal claim is the only claim asserted 
against a party or a person to be brought into the civil action; 
or 
(3) the party or person asserting the non-Federal claim 
is an intervenor or an applicant for intervention. 
(c) DISMIsSAL OR REMAND.-If a non-Federal daim in an 
action is asserted under subsection (a), the district court shall, 
within 90 days after the commencement of the action or, if later, 
within 90 days after the assertion of the non-Federal claim, deter-
mine whether the non-Federal claim should be dismissed or re-
mandep. The court shall dismiss or remand the non-Federal 
claim if it is not a permissible claim under subsection (a). The 
court may dismiss or remand the non-Federal claim if-
(1) the Federal claim is ~ismissed; 
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(2) the non-Federal claim substantially predominates 
over the Federal claim; or 
(3) the non-Federal claim should be tried separately. 
Upon entry of an order dismissing or remanding the non-Federal 
claim, the district court shall file with the order a written state-
ment of the reasons for the dismissal or remand. 
(d) TOLLING OF TIME LIMITATIONs.-The period of limita-
tions for any non-Federal claim asserted under subsection (a) 
shall be tolled while the claim is pending in Federal court and for 
a period of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) un-
less State law provides for a longer tolling period. 
(e) JUDGMENT ON NON-FEDERAL CLAIM EVEN IF FED-
ERAL CLAIM DISMISSED.-The district court may enter final judg-
ment on the merits of the non-Federal claim if it is not dismissed 
or remanded under subsection (c) even if, at the time of judgment, 
the Federal claim has been dismissed. 
(f) USE OF CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES To DETERMINE 
STATE LAw.-The district court, in determining the nature and 
scope of any non-Federal claim based on State law, shall use any 
certification procedures available for the determination of State 
law. 
(g) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section-
(1) the term "Federal claim" means any claim that has 
an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in 
the district courts; 
(2) the term "non-Federal claim" means any claim that 
does not have an independent, statutory basis for original ju-
risdiction in the district courts; and 
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-
session of the United States. 
(h) RELATIONSHIP To OTHER LAW.-This section super-
sedes any other provision of law except to the extent that a Fed-
eral statute expressly provides otherwise. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections at the be-
ginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new item: 
1367. Supplemental jurisdiction. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section 
shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the en-
actment of this Act. 
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ApPENDIX D: WEIS PROPOSAL 
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or in another 
section of this title, in any civil action on a claim for which the district 
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supple-
mental jurisdiction over all other claims arising out of the same trans-
action or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, including 
claims that require the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction under section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not 
have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by the plaintiff against per-
sons joined under Rules 14 and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, or over claims by persons seeking to intervene under Rule 24 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the complete 
diversity requirement of section 1332. 
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a 
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a) 
predominates over the claim or claims for which the district court has 
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims for 
which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) there are other appropriate 
reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the 
litigants, for declining jurisdiction. 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsec-
tion (a) shall be tolled while the claim is pending in the district court 
and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless state law pro-
vides for a longer tolling period. 
(e) The word "States," as used in this section includes The Terri-
tories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. 
(f) This section supersedes any other provision of law except to 
the extent that a federal statute expressly provides otherwise. 
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ApPENDIX E: ROWE-BuRBANK-MENGLER PROPOSAL 
§ 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by federal statute, in any civil action of which the 
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the 
joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded; solely on section 1332 of this title, the district 
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plain-
tiffs against persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed 
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19, or seeking to intervene as 
plaintiffs under Rule 24, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be incon-
sistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a 
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a) 
predominates over the claim or claims for which the district court has 
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims for 
which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) there are other appropriate 
reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the 
litigants, for declining jurisdiction. 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsec-
tion (a) shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling 
period. 
(e) The word "State," as used in this section includes the Territo-
ries, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
